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SUPERFUND CONTRACTORS AND
AGENCY CAPTURE
BRADFORD

C. MANK*

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1950s, commentators have been concerned about the
"capture" of administrative agencies by the industries they regulate. I From the time the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA or the Agency) was created in 1970, there has been concern
that regulated industries or even EPA's own bureaucracy would
capture the Agency.2 Today, there is considerable disagreement regarding whether EPA has been captured. Professors John P.
Dwyer3 and Richard J. Lazarus4 each have argued that the tradi• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.A., 1983, Harvard
Univeristy; J.D., 1987, Yale Law School. I wish to thank Joe Tomain and John
Applegate for their comments on earlier versions of this Article. Of course, they
are not responsible for any errors, which are solely my own.
I See generally MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74-95, 169-71 (1955)(asserting initial public interest leads to creation of regulatory commissions, but after public interest dissipates, regulated
industry tends to capture its regulators); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of
the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J.
467 (1952)(discussing how railroad industry captured Interstate Commerce Commission); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 65-66 (1988)(discussing pluralist political theory,
social psychological, and economic explanations of regUlatory capture)j JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THBY
Do IT 74-88 (l990)(discussing capture of regulatory agency by its regulated industry); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
BeON. 211, 212-13 (1976)(same)j Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684-86 (1975)(same). A leading administrative law treatise defines agency capture as follows: "An agency is
captured when it favors the concerns of the industry it regulates, which is wellrepresented by its trade groups and lawyers, over the interests of the general public,
which is often unrepresented." RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.7.2 (2d ed. 1992). During the late 1960s and early
1970s, Ralph Nader and his associates popularized the notion of regulatory capture, convincing Congress to enact reform measures to prevent capture. See EuGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THB BOOK: THE PROBLBM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 44-45 (1982).
2 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 315-17 (1991).
3 See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legis/ation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 233, 309-10 (1990).
34
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tional agency capture model does not apply to EPA. The congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), however, in a study
focusing on EPA's Superfund program rather than on EPA itself,
essentially charged that certain EPA contractors have captured the
Superfund program.s
Traditional agency capture theory focuses on the regulated industry's control of an entire agency. Yet, programs within agencies
are subject to extrinsic control or influence. This Article explores
the extent to which EPA's own contractors, along with the hazardous waste treatment industry and environmental groups, have captured the Superfund program and have pushed it to excessive
spending. Additionally, this Article will examine the role of parties
potentially responsible for cleanup costs in seeking to reduce those
costs.
Generally, contractors hired to clean up waste sites reinforce
EPA's tendency to adopt risk adverse, but often expensive, strategies for cleanup. This influence over EPA decisions is often abused.
This Article will explore solutions designed to curb abuse and to
reduce expenditures that do little to improve the public health or
environment. Reform designed to minimize abuse is essential, particularly since Superfund contractors will likely continue to participate in many future cleanups.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the history of Superfund
contractors' involvement in the program and discusses how
CERCLA6 settlement procedures affect EPA's use of contractors.
Part II introduces issues relating to agency capture theory. Part III
examines whether Superfund contractors have captured or unduly
influenced the program. Finally, Part IV discusses ways in which
EPA can improve the management of its contractors.
Lazarus, supra note 2, at 364-66.
See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
OTA-BP-ITE-51, AssESSING CoNTRACTOR USE IN SUPERFUND: A BACKGROUND PAPER OF OTA's AssESSMENT OF SUPERFUND IMPLEMENTATION 21
(1989)[hereinafter OTA AssESSMENT]. See also infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
6 CERCLA, discussed below, is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988). It is a statutory
scheme designed to remedy hazardous waste problems created by years of unregulated hazardous waste disposal. Alice T. Valder, Note, The Erroneous Site Selection Requirement for Arranger and Transporter Liability Under CERCLA, 91
CoLUM. L. REv. 2074, 2075 (1991). CERCLA created a "Superfund" that EPA
could draw on when in need of funds to clean up the worst hazardous waste
dumps. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988). See also infra note 7.
4

S
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I

CERCLA

AND

ITS CONTRACTORS

Many commentators have discussed the statutory provisions of
the Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), but few have emphasized the critical role
contractors play in implementing the Superfund program. This Article assumes the reader is familiar with CERCLA's statutory
framework, and will focus on provisions relating to EPA
contractors.
Under CERCLA, 7 EPA has the authority to recover from potentially responsible parties (pRPS)8 "all costs of removal or remedial action not inconsistent with the national contingency plan
(NCP)."9 CERCLA instructs EPA to develop a national priority
7 In response to fears concerning abandoned toxic waste dumps, Congress, in
1980, hastily enacted CERCLA; the sparse legislative history, because it failed to
indicate how the statute intended EPA to fulfill its comprehensive cleanup goals,
sowed seeds for controversy. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History ofthe Com-

prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Supelj'und', Act
of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. I, 1 (1982). See generally H.R. REp. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at I, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119 (legislative
history of CERCLA). For a discussion of CERCLA's statutory structure and history, see Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up

Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster,
19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 243-48 (1991).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). While CERCLA did not set forth an explicit
liability standard for PRPs, courts have generally adopted EPA's arguments favoring expansive PRP liability. See Mank, supra note 7, at 244. Courts have held that
all PRPs at a site, including present and past owners or operators of the site, generators of hazardous substances who arranged for disposal at the site, and transporters who delivered these substances, are jointly and severally liable for the entire
cost of the cleanup, even if some had made only a minimal contribution to the
contamination. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). See also Mank, supra note 7, at 244. A
PRP may be liable for contamination that occurred before the enactment of the
statute, even if it had followed commonly accepted, legal disposal methods. See,
e.g. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173-74; United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); Mank, supra note 7, at 244. EPA can sue a single PRP for the entire cost
of a site's cleanup, requiring the PRP to bring contribution actions against other
PRPs, some of whom may be bankrupt, unidentifiable, or dissolved. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (D. Mass. 1989),
aff'd 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); Mank, supra note 7, at 244. There are few viable
defenses for PRPs. See generally Mank, supra note 7, at 246.
9 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). CERCLA's legislative history suggests
Congress intended that PRPs fund cleanups to the greatest extent possible; some
congressional proponents of the legislation stated that the $1.6 billion Superfund
would be inadequate to address the hazardous waste problem and that PRPs would
have to fund much of the cost. See Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazard-
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list (NPL) of sites which pose the greatest danger to public health
and the environment. IO At the time of enactment, Congress approved $1.6 billion in funding over five years for a special government trust fund (the Superfund) to help finance cleanups.II
EPA prefers that PRPs pay for, or actually implement, the
cleanups themselves so that Superfund monies are available for
emergencies and situations where no viable PRPs exist. 12 However,
ous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensi.·e Approach, 42 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 65, 72-76 (1992). In United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982), the court stated that Congress intended
PRPs to bear the cleanup costs. See also Cadillac Fairview/Calif., Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co. 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988)(CERCLA promotes private cleanups); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 812 F.2d
383, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1987)("Since Superfund money is limited, Congress clearly
intended private parties to assume clean-up responsibility."); Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081-82 (1st Cir. 1986)(Superfund
inadequate to address problem so PRP liability provisions essential). In 1986,
Congress specifically authorized PRP-conducted cleanups. 42 U.S.c. § 9622(a)
(1988). See also Healy, supra, at 76 n.36.
10 EPA uses the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) to rank sites in cleanup priority and to consider their inclusion on the NPL. 42 U.S.c. § 9605 (1988); 40 C.F.R.
pt. 300 app. A (1992). See also Ragna Henrichs, Superfund's NPL: The Listing
Process, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 717, 729-37 (1989).
11 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)(provision establishing Superfund); id. § 9611 (current provision regarding Superfund). See also Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517(a), 100 Stat. 1613, 1772
(1986)(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988»(establishing the "Hazardous Substance
Superfund"); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(I) (1988)(authorizing the use of the Superfund
to pay the cost of government response actions under 42 U.S.c. § 9604 (1988»;
William W. Balcke, Note, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986
Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123, 123 (1988). Under the 1990 Superfund
reauthorization, Congress added $5.1 billion for the 1991 through 1995 fiscal years,
bringing the total funding for the program since 1980 to S15.2 billion. Program
Management by EPA Must Improve for Funding to Continue, Panel Chairman
Warns, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 678, 679 (1992)[hereinafter Program Management].
12 The Agency seeks as much cleanup money as possible from PRP contributions. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100. 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982); Mank, supra note 7, at 244 n.29; Owen T. Smith, The Expansi.·e
Scope of Liable Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 821, 821 (1989);
Enforcement Effort Has Been Inefficient, May Couse Cleanup Delay, Rand Report
Finds, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 826 (Sept. 15, 1989)[hereinafter Enforcement Effarr].
EPA prefers to use Superfund monies only where it is unable to identify PRPs,
when PRPs are unable to reach a private settlement under which they will conduct
the response, or when PRPs refuse to comply with cleanup orders issued under
§ 9606 of CERCLA. See Eugene P. Brantly, Note, Superfund Cost Reco.'e,y: May
the Government Recover "All Costs" Incurred Under Response Contracts?, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 968, 973 (1991). In practice, however, EPA is flexible when compromising with PRPs over who will conduct the cleanup and who will contribute
in funding the cleanup to settle litigation. Although EPA is usually successful at
suing PRPs, litigation is costly and time-consuming. See THOMAS W. CHURCH ET
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in reality the CERCLA process, which often entails lengthy site investigations and litigation, frequently leads the Agency to perform
the cleanup itself and later bring legal action against PRPs for
reimbursement.
A.

The History of Supeifund Contracting

At the time CERCLA was enacted, key actors in both Congress and EPA favored using private contractors, rather than a special agency bureaucracy, to implement the Superfund program. 13
Not only was it felt that private contractors could execute the
Superfund program more quickly, but the program itself was expected to be short-lived. 14 Thus, from the beginning, EPA contractors have performed most of the cleanup work. IS
When EPA studies and cleans up a Superfund site using government funds,16 it usually employs a private engineering or enviAL., WHAT WORKS? ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR SUPERFUND CLBANUPS 20,
38, 103 (l991)(study sponsored by Clean Sites); Ba1cke, supra note 11, at 130·31.
Large sites often involve dozens or hundreds ofPRPs. See CHURCH, supra, at 20
(600 PRPs at Laskin Poplar Oil Site in Jefferson, Ohio); Balcke, supra note 11, at
131 n.46 (nearly 400 PRPs at one site). The waves of cross-claims filed by numer·
ous PRPs can result in lengthy delays and escalating costs for all concerned. See
CHURCH, supra; Balcke, supra note 11, at 131. EPA has sought to minimize transaction costs by suing only the obvious or major, deep-pocket PRPs, but has often
failed in resolving substantive remedial issues before defendants assert cross-claims
against third-parties for contribution. See CHURCH, supra; Balcke, supra note 11,
at 131.
13 See OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 21.
14 See generally id. Professor Healy argues that Congress was aware in 1980
that $1.6 billion was inadequate to address the cleanup of all hazardous waste sites
and that some members anticipated that the CERCLA liability system would need
to replenish the Superfund. See Healy, supra note 9, at 74-75.
IS See OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 21.
16 EPA may conduct a cleanup using Superfund monies and recover these costs
from the PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(I) (1988). See also id. §§ 9604 (government
can clean up), 9607 (government can recover costs); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987)(CERCLA authorizes EPA to recover costs from responsible parties). CERCLA distinguishes between short-term removal actions to stop releases
or threatened releases which pose an immediate threat to the public, and long-term
remedial actions to clean up a site on a more or less permanent basis. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a) (1988). Because removal actions are more likely than remedial actions to
involve the expenditure of Superfund monies and require fewer studies to determine the best cleanup approaches, § 9604(c){l) limits removal actions to
$2,000,000 and a maximum of twelve months from the date of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance unless there is an emergency posing an
immediate risk to the public health or welfare that will not otherwise be addressed
on a timely basis, the President has determined the appropriate remedial action
pursuant to § 9604(c)(2) and a state has complied with § 9604(c)(3), or continued
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ronmental :firm (Superfund contractor) to evaluate site conditions
and to select, design, and implement appropriate remedies.J7 Even
when a PRP conducts the cleanup, a Superfund contractor often
supervises the work. 18 However, as discussed below, this contractor
involvement has not been without problems. Studies have identified
excessive contractor costs, poor quality work, and poor EPA supervision of contractors. 19 Also, Superfund contractor cleanups are
apparently much more expensive than PRP-conducted cleanups.2o
By 1986, it was clear that the problem of abandoned hazardous
waste sites was far greater than originally contemplated. There
were estimates that 1500 to 10,000 sites existed and that the cleanups of these sites would cost between $10 to $100 billion.21 In reresponse action is otherwise appropriate and consistent with the remedial action to
be taken. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(I). See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.41S(d) (1992)(listing
types of removal actions). Pursuant to the Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model
(SACM), EPA is seeking to combine the removal and remedial programs into a.
single streamlined process in which both types of work can proceed simultaneously
depending upon individual site conditions; under this process, the Agency would
view the removal and remedial programs as separate legal authorities, but not as
separate programs. Barnett Lawrence, EPA's Superfund Accelerated Cleanup
Model: A Paradigm for CERCLA Reauthorization, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2962,
2963 (Mar. 12, 1993). Under SACM, EPA has created a new intermediate category of "early action cleanups," which during a three to five year period would
seek to combine the easier aspects of a remedial action with the initial removal
action to facilitate faster cleanups, but would not attempt long-term remediation
projects for sites requiring ground water restomtion or other complicated work.
Ill. at 2964. The early action category would thus be an expansion of EPA's removal authority and therefore the Agency has relied upon the consistency exception in § 9604(c)(I)(C) for nontime-critica1 actions that exceed the $2,000,000 per
twelve month limits. Ill. at 2964-65. SACM's emphasis on expedited removal actions has the potential to conflict with the EPA's policy of getting responsible parties to peform cleanups whenever possible, instead of relying on fund-financed
cleanups. Ill. at 2965. Additionally, EPA may under certain conditions compel
the private parties to perform cleanups. 42 U.S.c. § 9606(a). To abate "imminent
and substantial endangerment" to the public health caused by an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance, EPA can require PRPs to undertake
the response action themselves. Ill. Further, EPA can seek injunctive re1iefin a.
United States District Court or issue administmtive orders against PRPs. Ill.;
Balcke, supra note 11, at 129. EPA can impose fines of up to $15,000 per day for
failure to comply. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1). Noncomplying PRPs are subject to
fines triple the amount EPA incurs in a site cleanup. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(c)(3).
17 See Brantly, supra note 12, at 968.
18 See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
19 See Brantly, supra note 12, at 969; infra notes 32-35, 44-47, 140-42, and
accompanying text.
20 See discussion infra section III.A.2.
21 Balcke, supra note 11, at 124. By 1989, EPA had compiled an inventory of
27,000 sites, listing more than 1000 on the NPL. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REpORT 162-63 (1989). See also Mank. supra
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sponse to these estimates, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA),22 passed in 1986, increased the
Superfund to $8.5 billion and reauthorized the fund for an additional five years. 23
After Congress enacted SARA, EPA realized that it had to
improve its contracting for, and its management of, cleanup work.24
Such reform was necessary because SARA required the Agency to
clean up many more sites than it originally expected. 2s Accordingly, EPA took action. First, it sought to expand the number of
contractors available to handle the increased amount of work and
hopefully to lower cleanup costS.26 Second, the Agency, through
its regional offices, sought to decentralize the management of
its Superfund contracts. The decentralization was supposed to accelerate cleanups and improve EPA oversight of Superfund
contractors. 27
Part of EPA's action to improve management of Superfund
contractors was to establish, in 1988, the Alternative Remedial
Contracting Strategy (ACRS).28 ACRS was intended to improve
EPA's contract management and award procedures by using more
contractors to perform remedial operations and by employing EPA
note 7, at 242 n.16. EPA has estimated a cost in excess of $30 billion to clean up
just the NPL sites. See Year-Long Study Set to Evaluate Alternative Super/ulld
Financing, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2131 (Mar. 29, 1991); Mank, supra note 7, at 242.
OTA estimated the total cost of cleaning up hazardous waste sites over the next
fifty years could reach $500 billion, excluding the costs of cleaning up Department
of Energy facilities. OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 1. See also Healy, supra
note 9, at 67 n.2, 73-74 n.29 (discussing OTA report).
22 PUB. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601·
9675 (1988)).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). Although due for revision in 1991, Congress
simply reauthorized CERCLA's existing statutory scheme until 1994. Mank,
supra note 7, at 245; Cleanup Program Extendedfor Three Years, Tax Authority for
Four Years in Budget Bill, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1243 (Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter
Cleanup]. Congress reauthorized the Superfund program without change until
September 30, 1994, and the Superfund itself until December 31, 1995. Mank,
supra note 7, at 245; Cleanup, supra. The new legislation funds the program at
$5.1 billion from October 1, 1991, to September 30, 1994. Mank, supra note 7, at
245 n.4O; Cleanup, supra.
24 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OP
EPA ALTERNATIVE SUPERFUND CONTRACTING STRATEGY REPORT (Oct. 1,
1991)[hereinafter CONTRACTING REpORT], reprinted in 22 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1505, 1506 (Oct. 4, 1991).
25 ld.
26 ld.
27 ld. at 1506-07.
28 ld. at 1507.
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regional offices to exercise more continuous supervision of the remedial process.29 Between January 1989 and June 1989, the Agency
awarded forty-five long-term ACRS contracts, each lasting up to
ten years, to twenty-three contracting firms; the contracts carried a
potential full-term value of about $6.6 billion.30 The forty-five contracts were distributed among EPA's ten regional offices based upon
the regional offices' anticipated needs. 31 ACRS contracts are discussed more thoroughly below.
By 1988, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the EPA
Inspector General released findings indicating several problems
with EPA's management of cost-reimbursement contracts with
Superfund contractors.32 For instance, the Agency often paid contractor invoices without reviewing them for reasonableness. 33
Many invoices paid by the Agency included markups of 143% to
321 % on equipment usage, as well as excessive labor costs.34 Additionally, the Agency frequently paid excessive award fees and bonuses under cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts and paid award
fees for poor quality work. 3S
While EPA was establishing its ACRS program, critics blasted
the Agency for spending too much Superfund money without PRP
reimbursement.36 A RAND report found that, from 1981 to 1989,
EPA spent $2.6 billion of its $4.5 billion Superfund appropriation.37
Although sixty-four percent was spent directly on cleanups, only
$230 million was recovered from PRPs, despite EPA's expenditure
of $261 million for its enforcement program.38 This criticism
Brantly, supra note 12, at 979 n.l05.
See CoNTRACITNG REpORT, supra note 24, at 1507.
31 See id.
32 See generally Brantly, supra note 12, at 969, 975-80, 990-98.
33 Id. at 991-93. However, the Agency generally considers such payments as
provisional and subject to revision after a final audit. Id.
34 Id. at 977.
3S Id. at 995-98.
36 See Healey, supra note 9, at 75-76 n.34; Roger J. Marzulla, Superfund 1991:
How Insurance Firms Can Help Clean Up the Nation's Hazardous Wastes, 4 Toxies
L. Rep. (BNA) 685, 688 (1989); Smith, supra note 12, at 821 n.4; Enforcement
Effort, supra note 12, at 826.
37 Enforcement Effort, supra note 12, at 826.
38 Id. at 826. In June 1992, testimony before the House Ways and Means Sub29

30

committee on Oversight asserted that EPA has recovered and deposited back into
the Superfund only $450 million out of the $6.2 billion dispensed by the Treasury
Department. See Program Management By EPA Must Improl'e For Funding To
Continue, Panel Chairman Warns, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 678 (June 19, 1992)[hereinafter Program Management]. As a result, the Subcommittee warned that Congress might not provide additional appropriations for the Superfund unless EPA
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prompted EPA to adopt an "Enforcement First" strategy for
Superfund. 39 Under that strategy, PRPs, rather than Superfund
contractors, would perform cleanups.40 The intent is to relieve
EPA of the need to initiate costly and time consuming lawsuits
against PRPs for cost recovery. The Enforcement First strategy
was a success. By 1991, PRPs were conducting cleanups at sixty
percent of active sites.41 However, this resulted in frequent
shortages of work for ACRS contractors.42 Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that PRPs are increasingly reluctant to assume
cleanup responsibilities. 43
By 1992, EPA's Superfund contract management problems
had worsened. 44 According to the EPA Inspector General, the
improved its record of recovering costs from private parties. Id. Note that the
Agency has increased its recoveries from $46 million in Fiscal Year 1987 to over
$300 million in Fiscal Year 1991. See Alex A. Beehler et al., Contesting of
CERCLA Costs by Responsible Parties - There is No Contest, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envt!. L. Inst.) 10,763, 10,764 (Dec. 1992).
39 See CONTRACTING REpORT, supra note 24, at 1507.
40 Id.
41 Id. The sixty percent figure for PRP cleanups applies to remedial actions;
PRPs perform only twenty-five to thirty percent of removal actions. Lawrence,
supra note 16, at 2966 n.30. The Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model's (SACM)
emphasis on expedited removal actions may undermine the enforcement first strategy, although EPA contends that SACM can be consistent with the Agency's enforcement policies if PRP searches are expedited under SACM. Id. at 2965. Even
with expedited PRP searches, EPA may not be able to raise PRP participation in
early actions to the level of PRP participation in remedial actions. Id.
42 See CONTRACTING REpORT, supra note 24, at 1507. ACRS contractors had
already incurred large startup/administrative costs, representing a relatively high
percentage of the total costs billed to EPA. However, these costs have declined
from seventy percent of total ACRS contract outlays in Fiscal Year 1988 to an
expected twenty percent in Fiscal Year 1991. Id. This Article later explores the
extent to which these costs were justified and how EPA can improve its contract
management.
43 See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; CONTRACTING REPORT, supra
note 24, at 1507. Because of EPA's onerous treatment ofPRPs in its consent decrees and because PRPs must pay Superfund contractors to supervise their work,
the Agency might have difficulty increasing or maintaining the sixty percent PRP
share of cleanups. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. In addition, the
Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model's early action strategy for combining removal and remedial actions may reduce the percentage of PRP cleanups. See Lawrence, supra note 16; supra notes 16, 41, and accompanying text.
44 See generally The Collapse of Contract Management at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 326 (July
8, 1992)[hereinafter Collapse of Contract Management](testimony of J. Dexter
Peach, Assistant Comptroller General, GAO, and John C. Martin, EPA Inspector
General); Environment, Oversight Needed to Ensure That EPA Implements Contract Reform, IG Says, 58 Fed. Conts. Rep. (BNA) 2 d8 (summarizing July 8,
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Agency continued to reimburse contractors without adequate oversight and continued to pay excessive award fees. 4s Also, the average equipment usage markup by Superfund contractors had jumped
to 427%.46 Both the EPA Inspector General and an Assistant
Comptroller General in the GAO testified before Congress that
EPA had failed to correct serious contract management problems
between 1986 and 1988.47
About forty percent of EPA's work, including investigating
pollution and conducting cleanups, is done by private contractors.4S
There are legitimate reasons why EPA has relied so heavily on private contractors. From 1981 to 1992, EPA's total contract management program in all areas increased 237%, while its work force
grew only 25%.49 Since 1979, EPA's budget has not grown in real
dollars, while its workload increased significantly.so In 1989, OTA
recommended an increase in EPA staff and salaries to reduce the
Agency's dependence on contractors.Sl Nevertheless, by 1992 EPA
had just begun to increase its contract management staff. S2
1992, hearing)[hereinafter Oversight Needed].
45 See Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at 331. See also (hersight Needed, supra note 44.
46 See Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at 331; (h'ersight
Needed, supra note 44. However, former EPA Administrator William Reilly
stated that estintates of contractors overcharging EPA for the cost of cleanup
equipment may be inaccurate because such costs are calculated under the assumption that the equipment is used twenty-four hours each day. See Col/apse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at 331; (A'ersight Needed, supra note 44.
47 See Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at 331,354; (A'ersight
Needed, supra note 44.
48 Elizabeth Neus & Anne Willette, Who Will Cleanup Fernald? Companies
Corry Baggage of Their Own, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 2, 1992, at AI, A6.
49 Rose Gutfield, EPA Phases Out Computer Sciences Work in (A'erhaul, VIALL
ST. J., July 2, 1992, at B8.
50 See Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Review: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 320-21 (l991)[hereinafter
1992 Budget Hearings](statement of Richard L. Hembra, Director of Environment
Protection Issues, General Accounting Office). See also John A. Applegate, Worst
Things First: Risk, Information. and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances
Control, 9 YALE J. REG. 277, 279 n.1 (1992); Funding Plan for EPA Falls Short of
Inflation Needs ofAir, Water Programs. Lobbyists Contend, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2338 (Feb. 7, 1992)(quoting Environment Budget Priorities report stating EPA's
budget in real dollars has grown six percent since 1979, while its workload has
doubled).
51 OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 8 n.7.
52 See generally Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at 358-59.
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B. Settlements
SARA formalized EPA's settlement policies5J and created a
framework for settling CERCLA cases. 54 Section 9622 of SARA
authorizes the President, who delegates his authority to EPA, to
enter into agreements with PRPs "that are in the public interest and
consistent with the National Contingency Plan in order to expedite
effective remedial actions and minimize litigation."55 The number
and value of settlements increased after SARA was enacted. In Fiscal Year 1985 there were 135 settlements with an aggregate value of
$152.1 million; in Fiscal Year 1988 there were 221 settlements with
an aggregate value of $494.3 million. 56
The following sections provide background on CERCLA settlements. Understanding SARA's settlement policies is important
because they often affect the extent to which PRPs or Superfund
contractors influence EPA selection of remedies for particular sites.
The possibility of settlement also affects whether Superfund contractors or PRPs will conduct a cleanup.

1. Mixed Funding Settlements
SARA authorizes EPA to enter "mixed funding" settlements,
where monies from both PRPs and the Superfund finance remediation of a site. 57 The conference report accompanying SARA identified circumstances in which mixed funding settlements might be
appropriate. These circumstances include the presence of orphan
shares of waste caused by bankrupt, unidentifiable, or dissolved
PRPs, and situations where PRPs refuse to settle. 58
In 1988, EPA promulgated a guidance document on mixed
funding. 59 The Agency described three scenarios in which EPA, at
its discretion, agrees to conduct or pay for a portion of a response
42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988).
ld. See Balcke, supra note II, at 126, 133-34.
55 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988).
56 Jennifer Martin, Comment, A Prescription to Expedite Hazardous Waste
Cleanups: De Minimis Settlements and ADR, 21 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 361,
362 n.8 (1991).
57 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (1988). See also Balcke, supra note II, at 136-38;
Barry E. Hill, Negotiating Superfund Mixed Funding Settlements, 21 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,651 (Nov. 1991); Mank, supra note 7, at 246.
58 H.R. CONF. REp. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345.
59 See Superfund Program; Mixed Funding Settlements, 53 Fed. Reg. 8279
(1988)[hereinafter Mixed Funding]; Hill, supra note 57, at 10,652.
53

54
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action, or both. 60 Of the three, EPA prefers preauthorization agreements. Under preauthorization, a PRP conducts the remedial action and later seeks reimbursement from the Superfund for costs
deemed not its responsibility.61 Preauthorization recognizes that
PRPs often perform the most economical cleanups and that EPA,
as a regulatory rather than a public works agency, lacks the proper
staffing to perform cleanups.62
SARA states that EPA shall make all reasonable efforts to recover costs for Superfund reimbursement. 63 Use of "reasonable efforts" leaves the Agency some discretion. Thus, EPA, when
involved in mixed funding settlements, will either use the Superfund
to cover orphan shares or will insist upon recovering all costs from
PRPS.64 That is, EPA will pursue either an uncompromising or an
accommodating approach with PRPs. The conference report
accompanying SARA emphasized that "the burdens of mixed funding should be shifted to non-settlors."6S Yet, EPA has suggested it
will, in certain circumstances, approve mixed funding where the
Superfund permanently pays a portion of the cleanup.66 Obviously,
PRPs are more likely to settle if EPA assumes the risk of paying for
part of the cleanup for costs not recoverable from nonsettlors. 67 By
1991, there had been few mixed funding settlements. 68
(i() See Mixed Funding, supra note 59, at 8279-84 (discussing "preauthonzation," "cash-out," and "mixed work" arrangements); Balcke, supra note 11, at 137
n.75; Hill supra note 57, at 10,652.
61 See Mixed Funding, supra note 59, at 8282; Balcke, supra note 11, at 137;
Hill, supra note 57, at 10,652.
62 See Balcke, supra note 11, at 135 n.68; Mank, supra note 7, at 259-60.
63 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (1988).
64 See Balcke, supra note 11, at 137-38.
6S H.R. CoNF. REp. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986
u.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345.
66 See Balcke, supra note 11, at 138 n.80. See also CHURCH, supra note 12, at
96 (government implicitly accepts some costs in Superfund settlements).
67 See generally CHURCH, supra note 12, at 34-35, 51-52, 81, 96, 104 (discussing
mixed funding settlement with General Motors at Harvey and Knott's Drum site
in Delaware).
68 See Hill, supra note 57, at 10,651. In response to industry criticism that
EPA has rarely used mixed funding settlements, the Agency has hired a contmctor
to talk with interested parties and get their views on how mixed funding could be
used more. Mixed Funding, Risk Assessment Targeted in Studies to be Released
Soon by Agency, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2718 (Feb. 19, 1993). The report is being
circulated for comment at the Agency and will be sent back to the contmctor for
final editing. ld. For the purposes of this Article, it is significant that EPA used a
contractor for this work rather than its own staff.
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2. RI/FS Settlements
SARA authorizes EPA to enter partial settlements where a
PRP conducts the remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS)
without agreeing beforehand to perform the cleanup.69 The RI/FS
process is critical for determining a site's problems and weighing
alternative remedies. 70 Because the RI/FS determines the cleanup
strategy, contractor involvement in the RI/FS process is essential if
contractors are to understand their role in the Superfund program.
In the remedial investigation, EPA-generally through private
contractors-or a PRP collects data, estimates the nature and extent of contamination at the site, characterizes the physical condition of the site, identifies likely routes of contaminant migration,
and estimates the risks that exposure presents to surrounding populations.71 The Agency next conducts a feasibility study, again usually through contractors. Using information from the remedial
investigation, EPA develops and evaluates potential remedies for a
site, and selects a preferred remedy.72 RI/FSs generally require two
to three years to complete. 73
69 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). See also Balcke, supra note II, at 138·40;
Mank, supra note 7, at 253. The Agency must first determine whether the PRP is
"qualified," and also must hire a contractor, at the PRP's expense, to oversee the
RI/FS. [d. U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). Furthermore, CERCLA mandates that all
proposed RI/FS settlements be filed as consent decrees, requiring court approval
and a public comment period. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(B). One study
found that EPA and PRPs negotiated having a PRP conduct the RI/FS in 48% of
EPA Region III's 152 NPL sites; in 49.2% of Region V's 266 NPL sites; and in
36.1% of Region IV's 155 NPL sites. CHURCH, supra note 12, at 124 nn.30, 32.
The study's authors admitted to a number of methodological limitations in the
study. Still, the study suggests that many PRPs are in fact interested in the possi·
bility of conducting RI/FS's. CHURCH, supra note 12, at 124 nn.30, 32.
70 See Balcke, supra note 11, at 128.
71 Brantly, supra note 12, at 974 (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, EPA/54O/G·89/004, GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING REMEDIAL INVES·
TIGATIONS AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES UNDER CERCLA·INTERIM FINAL 1·6
(1988».
72 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.430(e)-(f). See also Brantly, supra note 12, at 974.
73 See Balcke, supra note 11, at 128 n.28. The Center for Hazardous Waste
Management found that RI/FSs were significantly slower after passage of SARA,
averaging thirty-three months to complete. CHURCH, supra note 12, at 135 nn.26,
28 (citing Alfred R. Light, Superfund: Evaluations and Proposalsfor Reform, Ad·
dress at the 52nd National Conference of the American Society for Public Admin·
istration (1990». Post-SARA RI/FSs are slower because SARA imposed
additional requirements for entering into an RI/FS settlement. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a)(I) (1988). See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg.
5034, 5036-38 (1985)[hereinafter 1985 Policy]. See also Balcke, supra note II, at
139 (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) with 1985 Policy, supra, at 5038). There is
evidence that private parties conduct RI/FSs faster than EPA. See Balcke, supra
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After providing public notice of the RIfFS and receiving public comment on the preferred remedy, EPA announces its final decision in a Record of Decision.74 Finally, the Agency, with its
contractors, develops and implements a remedial design plan.7S
In June 1990, EPA announced a new policy barring PRPs
from performing RIlFSs. The Agency claimed that PRPs frequently produced biased documents which underestimate site risks.
This, in turn, required EPA to carefully supervise the work ofPRPs
and their contractors.76 The new policy would shift the task of performing the RI/FSs from PRPs to Superfund contractors.
Business groups sued EPA over its new policy,77 asserting that
government contractor RIfFSs are two to five times more expensive
than private company RI/FSS.78 Also, industry groups contended
that EPA failed to submit the new policy for public comment and
that the Agency should conduct a more thorough policy review
before making any change.79 This criticism culminated in a consent
decree between EPA and industry groups, in which the Agency
agreed to review its decision and solicit public comment. 80
In February 1992, EPA published a notice of evaluation and
request for public comment in the Federal Register. 81 The Agency
stated that its evaluation did not dictate any specific outcome and
that it would adopt a different approach if it would better serve the
note 11, at 134-35; Mank, supra note 7, at 253 nn.90-91. Pursuant to the
Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model program, EPA is now experimenting with
ways to streamline the site investigation process. Lawrence, supra note 16, at
2963-64. See also supra note 16. For example, the Agency is testing the combination of the remedial investigation with the expanded site investigation that collects
data to prepare the HRS scoring package, which then is used to determine if a site
will be listed on the NPL. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 2964. See also supra note
10 and accompanying text.
74 40 C.F.R. § 3oo.430(f) (1992).
7S Id. § 300.435.
76 Superfund Program: Settlement Policy on the Performance of Risk Assessments at Superfund Sites, 57 Fed. Reg. 6116, 6116 (1992)[hereinafter Risk
Assessments].
77 Chemical Mfr. Assoc. v. EPA, No. 90-1460 (D.C. Cir.), cited in Risk Assessments, supra note 76, at 6118 n.4.; Mank, supra note 7, at 253 n.90.
78 Wade Lambert & Ellen J. Pollock, Former Ashland Oil Chairman Gets 2
Yea~' Probation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at B8; Mank, supra note 7, at 253
n.90.
79 Public Comment, Risk Assessment Policy Review Key to Settlement Between
EPA, Industry Groups, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1931 (1991)[hereinafter Public
Comment].
80 Id.
81 Risk Assessments, supra note 76, at 6118-19. See also Public Comment,
supra note 79, at 1931.
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public's interest. 82 The Agency estimated that it would complete its
evaluation by February 1993. 83 After completion, EPA will submit
its evaluation for a second public comment period and plans to issue
a final decision four months thereafter. 84
3.

Consent Decrees and Superfund Contractors

Many PRPs believe litigation is cheaper than consenting to
government cleanup demands. 8s Some commentators agree, challenging the conventional wisdom that it is cheaper to settle because
PRPs can perform cleanups more efficiently than EPA contractors.86 They argue that EPA's standard consent decree forms are so
onerous that PRPs are better off either allowing EPA to perform
the cleanup itself or waiting for the Agency to issue an administrative order requiring that PRPs perform the work. The commentators claim that when PRPs perform a cleanup, the cost of EPA
contractor supervision wipes out much of the perceived savings. 87
Furthermore, EPA oversight contractors often require that PRP
contractors redo their work, something the Agency is less likely to
require its own contractors to do. 88 Thus, the extent to which the
Enforcement First strategy shifts the cost of cleanups from the government to PRPs is limited.
Risk Assessments, supra note 76, at 6118.
Id. On March 15, 1993, EPA published notice of the availability of the
Agency's evaluation report on risk assessment and also its response to public com·
ments submitted in response to the February 20, 1992, notice on how EPA should
conduct the risk assessment evaluation. Superfund Program: Policy on the Per·
formance of Risk Assessment Evaluation Report and Responses to Public Com·
ments on EPA's Conduct of the Evaluation: Notice of Availability, 58 Fed. Reg.
13,757 (1993). By April 14, 1993, the public must submit comments on the risk
assessment evaluation. Id.
84 Risk Assessments, supra note 76, at 6118·19. See also Public Comment,
supra note 79, at 1931 (settlement between EPA and industry groups requires sec·
ond comment period).
8S Jeff Bailey, Economy Alone May Not Rejuvenate Chemical Waste, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 3, 1992, at B3. See also Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, CERCLA
Settlements with the EPA, N.Y.L.J., April 24, 1992, at 3 (EPA consent decrees so
onerous that PRPs should consider litigation instead).
86 See, e.g., Robert W. Frantz, Supetfund Settlements: A Vanishing Breed, 6
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 14, 17; Kass & Gerrard, supra note 85, at 3 n.9: Brad·
ford F. Whitman, EPA's Model Supetfund Consent Decree Presents Major Risks/or
Settling Party, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2314, 2314-16 (1992).
87 Frantz, supra note 86, at 17: Kass & Gerrard, supra note 85, at 3: Whitman,
supra note 86, at 2314-15.
88 Frantz, supra note 86, at 17; Kass & Gerrard, supra note 85, at 3; Whitman,
supra note 86, at 2314-15.
82

83
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II
AGENCY CAPTURE AND EPA
Traditional capture theory examines the extent to which regulated industries have captured their regulators. Under CERCLA,
EPA regulation of PRPs is not true regulation; the Agency seeks
redress by filing tort-like actions to compel PRPs to either perform
cleanups or pay for completed cleanups.89 The Agency does not
regulate its Superfund contractors or environmental groups. Still,
Superfund contractors and environmental groups play an important
role in shaping Superfund cleanup methods and cost allocation. Influencing policy is not identical to capturing a regulatory agency.
However, where, as here, a major agency program is being heavily
influenced, it is necessary to abandon a rigid definition of capture.
Otherwise, those problems associated with traditional agency capture, which can also affect public benefit programs like Superfund,
might continue unnoticed. Thus, this Article discusses agency capture as a continuum in which the degree of capture ranges from an
interest group exercising some influence over an agency's policies to
situations where a regulated industry completely captures a regulatory agency.90
President Nixon and Congress considered agency capture
when they established EPA and its organizational structure.91
Since 1970, both Congress and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) have sought intensive oversight of the Agency, fighting one another for control of EPA's destiny for fear that the
Agency would be captured.92
89 Although suing for past PRP conduct is not direct regulation, the threat of
future liability under CERCLA obviously affects some firms' current and future
behavior. Also, EPA does have quasiregulatory functions in supervising PRP
cleanups. See infra notes 152, 158, 161, and accompanying text.
90 Ayres and Braithwaite's discussion of capture in terms of the amount of lobbying expenditures by an industry implies there is a continuum of capture. See
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 63-70 (1992). Understanding capture requires distinguishing between capture as an ideal type or Platonic idea in which complete
capture is possible, and capture that is found in the real world, which is necessarily
incomplete.
91 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 311, 315-20. 364. See generally Robert
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and tlte Courts: 1kenty Yean of
Law and Politics, 54 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 249, 264-72 (1991).
92 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 364. An interesting issue, beyond the scope of
this Article, is whether OMB could capture EPA through Ol\ffi's role in applying
cost-benefit analysis under President Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (1981). A number of commentators have discussed whether Ol\ffi's
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A. EPA and Traditional Models of Agency Capture
Despite these fears, there is no consensus as to whether EPA
has been captured. Professors Dwyer and Lazarus have each argued that it is unlikely that any single interest group could capture
EPA. Their position is based on the premise that EPA has a "social
mission" and manages a wide range of programs affecting many
constituencies. 93 Dwyer and Lazarus contend that capture theory
developed in response to the behavior of agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, which only regulate a distinct kind of
economic activity.94 They observe that agency capture theory assumes that special interests wield undue influence over an agency
because of the general public's fleeting concern with complex regulatory issues; this slight concern is no match for concerted lobbying
efforts by regulated industries. 9s
Both Dwyer and Lazarus assert that EPA does not fit into this
cost-benefit analysis role unduly infringes on the statutory duties of regulatory
agencies, although they have not explicitly examined the problem in terms of
agency capture. See generally Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfield, Rulemaking in the Shadows: The Rise of OMB and Cost-Benefit Analysis ill Environmental
Decisionmaking, 16 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143 (1991). A similar issue is whether
the Bush administration's Council on Competitiveness, which oversaw the regulatory review functions of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) and which was headed by Vice President Dan Quayle, sought to capture
EPA and other agencies on behalf of powerful industries. See generally CHRISTINE
TRIANO & NANCY WATZMAN, ALL THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEN: How THE
QUAYLE COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS SECRETLY UNDERMINES HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (1991)(highly critical account by
OMB Watch and Public Citizen's Congress Watch); Michael Duffy, Need Friellds
in High Places, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 25 (discussing allegations that Dan Quayle's
Council on Competitiveness attempted to undercut EPA's wetlands and clean air
policies). The Clinton administration has abolished the Council on Competiveness,
but will continue the centralized regulatory review procedures established by President Reagan in Executive Order 12,291. Clinton Administration Orders Retractioll
ofDozens ofLast-Minute Bush Regulations, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2571,2572 (Jan.
29, 1993). Vice President Albert Gore stated that OIRA will review the bulk of
regulations, and that the Clinton administration will develop a new regulatory appeals process. Id. See also Disputes Over Environmental Rules to go to OMB Office, EPA Chief Says, 23 Env't Rep. 2720, 2720 (Feb. 19, 1993)[hereinafter OMB
Office](EPA Administrator Carol Browner said OIRA will handle regulatory review). OMB Director Leon Panetta has stated that Gore may establish a review
group within OMB to resolve conflicts among agencies over regulations, and Gore
himself, on February 8, 1993, said that the Vice President will be the ultimate
arbitrator of interagency disputes over proposed regulations. Id.
93 See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 278, 309-10; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 364·66.
94 See generally Huntington, supra note 1 (examining agency capture at the
Interstate Commerce Commission).
95 Dwyer, supra note 3, at 309; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 364-65.
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theory.96 First, they contend that the public has retained a strong
interest in environmental issues.97 Professor Lazarus points out
that public opinion stopped President Reagan from reversing pro
environmental policies,98 and citizen groups favoring environmentalism have effectively mobilized public opinion and influenced
agency policy.99 Professor James Q. Wilson strengthens Dwyer and
Lazarus' contention. Wilson argues that, since the 1970s, techniques like direct mail have made it easier for public-interest groups
to organize the public; this, in turn, makes it more difficult for industries to capture an agency.loo Although public interest groups
generally have less influence with an agency than industrial groups
do, Wilson maintains that today it is rare to find an agency serving
only a regulated industry's interests. lOI
Second, Dwyer and Lazarus assert that capture of the entire
EPA is improbable because the Agency's regulated community has
too many conflicting interests. l02 For example, fearing their competitors might gain an advantage, companies that have heavily invested in pollution control equipment would likely oppose
relaxation of pollution restrictions. Also, pollution control equipment manufacturers, a sizeable industry, would probably resist deregulatory efforts. l03
Additionally, EPA employees' belief in the Agency's "social
mission" obstructs the capture of EPA. According to Lazarus, that
belief causes EPA employees to discount needs of the regulated. 1M
In fact, Lazarus argues that Agency employees enhance, not hinder,
private sector career opportunities by acting aggressively; aggressive action, because it results in forceful enforcement, increases the
regulated industries' demand for former EPA employees' environmental expertise. lOS
Dwyer, supra note 3, at 309; Lazarus, supra note 2. at 364.
Dwyer, supra note 3, at 309-10; Lazarus, supra note 2. at 365.
98 Lazarus, supra note 2, at 365 n.335.
99 Id. at 365.
100 WILSON, supra note 1, at 83-84. For example, although the Environmental
Defense Fund's membership is relatively small. the group plausibly chums to speak
on behalf of a significant portion of the public. Id. at 84.
101 Id. at 84-85.
102 Dwyer, supra note 3, at 310; Lazarus, supra note 2. at 365.
103 Dwyer, supra note 3, at 310; Lazarus. supra note 2. at 365. See also S170
Billion Spent on Environment in 1992; Market Continuing to Gro~~ Economist Says,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3022, 3022-23 (discussing size of U.S. pollution control
industry).
104 Lazarus, supra note 2, at 365-66.
lOS See id. at 366 n.347. See also WILSON, supra note I, at 86-87 (asserting that
96
97
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Focusing exclusively on traditional agency capture theory,
Dwyer and Lazarus each make persuasive arguments that regulated
industries are unlikely to capture the entire EPA. However, they
fail to address the strong possibility that capture of a discrete unit
within an agency may occur. Specifically, outside groups may have
captured, or at least exercise undue influence over, the Superfund
program.

B. Interest Groups and Agencies
Straying from the traditional definition of agency capture,
some scholars have discussed agency capture within broader paradigms, such as interest group politics. Determining what constitutes capture as opposed to interest group politics, however, is
difficult once one ventures beyond the traditional definition of capture. Professor Paul Quirk observes that "regulatory decisions do
not necessarily present neat conflicts with a clear and homogeneous
'public interest' on one side, pitted against a 'regulated industry interest,' also clear and homogeneous, on the other."106
Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite use game theory to
present an idea of regulatory capture in which the degree of capture
is a positive function of lobbying expenditures by an interest
groUp.l07 But Professor Richard Stewart asserts that informal accommodations between regulators and regulated industry can benefit society by reducing costly litigation, and do not necessarily
represent undue industry influence or capture. lOS Stewart argues
the more professional the orientation toward work, the more likely an employer
will hire a former government employee for her skills than for her contacts).
106 PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 6 (1981).
107 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 66 ("capture is 'purchased'
by lobbying expenditures, L, such as preparing submissions, the time involved in
building friendships with regulators, and the cost of bribes"). Under their theory,
different levels of lobbying expenditures lead to three different policy results
(pareto-efficient, pareto-inefficient, and socially ambiguous). Also, they discuss
three types of capture: (1) inefficient capture; (2) zero-sum capture; and (3) efficient
capture. See id. at 63-70. According to Ayres and Braithwaite, some types of
lobbying may lead to socially beneficial, or efficient, capture outcomes because the
interest group convinces the agency to adopt a better policy. Other types of lobbying may lead to "zero sum," or inefficient, capture or have ambiguous welfare results. Furthermore, public interest groups often raise the costs of capture by
forcing a firm to also lobby public interest groups having the legal authority or
political influence to challenge an agency decision which favors the firm. See id. at
71-73.
108 See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 655, 663·65. Ayres and
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that the rise of new types of social regulation such as environmental
law, along with the growth of public interest groups and changes in
administrative law designed in part to prevent regulatory capture,
have undermined accommodation and have led to increased
litigation. 109
C.

The Problem of Baselines

In a broad sense, this Article's premise of "capture" of the
Superfund program refers to various interest groups seeking to influence and lobby the Agency to change its policies. Measuring the
success of such influence is difficult.
Determining whether an interest group has exercised undue influence on an agency requires a baseline, or background principle,110 of what the agency's decision would have been absent that
group's lobbying efforts. For instance, in the case of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, one wonders what railroad rates would
have been had the Commission acted in the public interest rather
Braithwaite reach similar conclusions regarding potential advantages from cooperation between regulators and the regulated industry. They argue that some forms
of regulatory capture are pareto-efficient and should be encouraged. See AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 63-81.
109 See generally Stewart, Discontents of Legalism, supra note 108, at 659-60,
664-68, and passim. Stewart suggests that market incentives replace regulatory
legalism wherever possible. Id. at 657,683-86. Ayres and John Braithwaite share
similar concerns about counterproductive litigation. They argue that a "zealous"
public interest group may deter pareto-efficient forms of capture by continuing litigation against socially beneficial agreements between industry and an agency.
ARYES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 75-78. Instead of Stewart's market
incentive solution, Ayres and Braithwaite argue in favor of an empowerment theory of republican tripartism that would encourage cooperative behavior by providing public interest groups a larger voice in the regulatory process so that such
groups have less incentive to bring litigation. ARYES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note
90, at 75-78, 81-86. Stewart argues that only a limited potential for encouraging
regulatory negotiations exists among industry, public interest groups, and agencies
because public interest groups raise funds through publicity from litigation; Ayres
and Braithwaite, however, are confident that tripartism can induce public interest
groups to abandon unnecessary litigation. Compare Stewart. supra note 108, at
657,674-78 (regulatory negotiations are likely to be limited in light of propensity of
public interest groups to pursue litigation) with AyRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 90, at 75-86 (the empowerment of public interest groups can work to overcome such groups' tendency to litigate). Stewart is skeptical as to whether game
theory can predict the outcome of environmental negotiations. See Stewart, supra
note 108, at 676-77.
110 See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 116, 141-42,
207-21, and passim (1990)(discussing how much of public law still covertly accepts
common law, rather than post-New Deal administrative state, as a baseline).
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than to protect the declining railroad industry.111
There are methodological difficulties in posing counterfactual
hypthoses even for a relatively simple variable such as railroad
rates. 112 That EPA faces serious policy and scientific disputes regarding which are the best cleanup remedies causes more difficulty
in establishing a baseline. Because of the difficulties encountered in
measuring baselines, this Article attempts to develop a qualitative,
rather than a quantitative, answer to whether some groups are exercising undue influence in ways that Congress and EPA can and
should limit.ll3 The Superfund program is too important a resource allocation to look the other way.

III
EPA CONTRACTORS, DEPENDENT BUREAUCRACIES,
AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS: THE
"CAPTURE" OF SUPERFUND
The most obvious group that would want to capture the
Superfund program is the PRPs. While PRPs exercise some influence over EPA, they are not necessarily the group most successful
at influencing Agency policy. One commentator argues that
"EPA's reliance on industry for information and expertise creates
an institutional bias favoring potentially responsible parties."114 He
concedes, however, that the Agency is "not necessarily captured in
the sense that industry controls the decisionmaking process," and
that the Agency, in seeking industry advice to help develop efficient
policies, believes it is acting in the public's interest. 11s Interestingly,
he claims that Superfund contractors playa critical role in the reI a111 See generally Huntington, supra note 1 (discussing how railroad industry
captured Interstate Commerce Commission).
112 Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington compared railroad freight rates with
wholesale prices from 1908 to 1950 to show ICC's acquiescence to railroad demands. See Huntington, supra note I, at 481-85. Yet, Huntington could not
demonstrate what would have happened to rates absent ICC regulation. Professor
Paul J. Quirk asserts that assumptions regarding what agencies would have done
absent industry influence are often driven by the critic's view of what the agency
should have done. QUIRK, supra note 106, at 4.
113 Professor Quirk has suggested that in the case of complex regulatory issues
involving several conflicting interest groups, a qualitative analysis is necessary because such problems are beyond the competence of strictly objective analysis. Sec
id. at 6.
114 Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18
EcOLOGY L.Q. 173, 184 (1991).
115Id.
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tionship between PRPs and EPA: "Contractors who develop
cleanup plans work both for EPA and potentially responsible parties and create a link between the two parties."116

A. Superfund Contractors: Who Runs the Superfund?
How much influence do Superfund contractors exert over
Superfund program policies? Examining the effectiveness of the
Agency in managing its contractors provides insight into the answer. The less effective the management, the more likely that contractors are influencing the program. Also, because the Agency and
PRPs frequently use the same contractors,I17 conflicts of interest
between contractors and PRPs, discussed below, can shape Agency
Superfund policy.
1. How Clean is Clean?

Congressional investigators estimate that Superfund contractors spend 100% to 500% more than PRPs to clean up a given
site. IIS Contractors would probably defend themselves by claiming
that they perform more stringent cleanups than PRPs. The Agency
contends that, absent close supervision by EPA staff or Superfund
contractors, PRP RI/FSs generally underestimate risk. 119 Indeed,
a 1992 GAO study found that in a period from 1987 to 1990, PRPs
usually selected less protective containment remedies than did
EPA.I20 These facts are disputable. Either PRP-hired contractors
are underestimating risk to please the PRPs or EPA contractors are
overestimating risks to justify their employment or to earn excessive
compensation. The difficulty of ascertaining appropriate cleanup
116
117

118
119

Id. at 213-14.
See Public Comment, supra note 79, at 1931.
See OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 7.
See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.

120 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-138, SUPERFUND:
PROBLEMS WITH THE CoMPLETENESS AND CoNSISTENCY OF SITE CLEANUP
PLANS 3 (1992)[hereinafter GAO, SUPERFUND PROBLEMs](prlvate parties selected
waste containment at forty-three percent of sites they managed whereas EPA did
so at only twenty-five percent of sites it managed); GAO says Pri.'ate Parties Select
Containment Remedies More Often Than EPA. 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 724 (July 3,
1992)[hereinafter GAO Says]. However, Don Clay, EPA assistant administrator
for solid waste and emergency response, disputed the GAO's conclusions and
stated that differences in the number of containment remedies were based on the
types of sites involved. Id. at 725. Furthermore, Clay asserts that 1991 data shows
that PRPs now select treatment, rather than containment, remedies as often as
does EPA. Id. at 725.
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standards for a given site complicates this issue. 121
Although it favors permanent treatment solutions,122 SARA
gives EPA considerable discretion in weighing costs and other factors when determining cleanup levels.123 Section 9621(d) of
CERCLA requires EPA to consider legally applicable or relevant
federal and state requirements in other environmental statutes when
making this determination. 124 In 1988, OTA criticized EPA for
choosing impermanent cleanup solutions, such as capping a site or
using deed restrictions, rather than permanent solutions. 12s PRPs
have also been criticized for their cleanup choices. Several studies,
finding that PRP RI/FSs are biased in favor of minimizing costs,
asserted that extensive EPA supervision was necessary to produce
acceptable PRP RI/FSS.126 As a result, at least one commentator
has argued that PRPs and the Agency are doing a poor job of protecting the public. 127

2.

Waste and Superfund Contractors

Exploring whether EPA contractors operate cost effectively is
easier than attempting to assess whether recommendations by PRP
or EPA contractors best serve the public interest. In 1988, GAO,
the EPA Inspector General, and EPA released reports showing that
the Agency had failed to control the costs and work quality of its
Superfund contractors in both remedial and removal projects. 128 In
1989, OTA severely criticized the use of EPA contractors in
Superfund for both cost and policy reasons. 129
One EPA critic acknowledged that EPA, by adopting
ACRS,130 may have improved its Superfund contract management
121 See generally Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution of the Conflict Between
Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting Cleanup Standards Under Superfund, 15
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 241 (1990).
122 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1988).
123 Id. § 9621(a). See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 375 (1992)(Congress gave EPA "substantial discretion"); Brown, supra note 121, at 278 (EPA has reserved to itself "almost
unlimited discretion").
124 See PERCIVAL, supra note 123, at 375-77; Brown, supra note 121, at 249-50.
125 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, ARE WE CLEANING Up? 12-14
(1988). See also PERCIVAL, supra note 123, at 376-77 (discussing OTA study);
Folk, supra note 114, at 183-84 (same).
126 See Risk Assessments, supra note 76, at 6117.
127 See Folk, supra note 114, at 183-84.
128 See Brantly, supra note 12, at 969, 975-79, 990-97.
129 See generally OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at passim.
130 See Brantly, supra note 12, at 979 n.105. See supra notes 28-31, 42, and
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since the critical 1988 studies. 131 Soon thereafter, however, the
Agency admitted that its ACRS program had serious problems. 132
Additionally, many studies continued to criticize EPA's use of contractors in all its programs.133
In 1988, EPA hired forty-five contractors under ACRS contracts lasting up to ten years each; at the time, PRPs were conducting only thirty-eight percent of the cleanup work and EPA
anticipated that Superfund contractors would perform most of the
remainder. 134 The ACRS program, designed to improve EPA's
management of contractors, may have worsened the situation. A
Washington Post story charged that, since 1988, nearly one-third of
the $200 million used by EPA to clean Superfund sites had been
spent on administrative expenses and "program management" of
private contractors.l3S Further, the story charged that Superfund
contractors often had little real work to perform, that EPA had
spent millions of dollars for unused pollution-detection devices, and
that, under the ACRS program, EPA had paid the rent, salaries,
training and recruiting costs, profits, and bonuses of contractors,
regardless of how many cleanups they managed. 136
In a memorandum issued the same day as the Washington Post
story, the EPA Administrator questioned the cost effectiveness of
ACRS in light of the fact that PRP cleanups had doubled in
number while EPA contractor cleanups had declined. 137 The Administrator appointed a task force to investigate the charges of contractor abuses. 138 Soon thereafter, several members of Congress
demanded an investigation into the EPA Inspector General's failure
to audit most of the Superfund contractors' billings, amounting to
accompanying text.
131 See Brantly, supra note 12, at 979.
132 See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
133 See infra notes 135-36, 143-46, 149-51, 169, 172-80, and accompanying text.
134 See CONTRACTING REpORT, supra note 24, at 1507; Michael Weisskopf, Ad-

ministrative Costs Drain

'Supeifund~'

Few Toxic Waste Sites Actually Cleaned Up,

W ASHlNGTON POST, June 19, 1991, at AI; Agency Official Downplays Contract
Problems, Says u.s. Facilities will Dominate NPL Process, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1410 (Oct. 4, 1991).
135 Weisskopf, supra note 134, at AI.
136 Id.; Cost Recovery Rule Withdrawn from OMB Pending Study of Supetj'und
Contracting System, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1188 (Aug. 30, 1991)[hereinnfter Cost
Recovery].
137 See Cost Recovery, supra note 136, at 1188.
138 Reilly Creates Task Force to Examine Contractor Abuses in Response to Story,
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 524 (June 28, 1991)[hereinnfter Reilly Creates].
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more than one billion dollars from 1983 to 1990. 139
On October 1, 1991, EPA issued a report which recommended
changes to lower Superfund contractor costs while increasing their
utility.l40 The report acknowledged that contractors had billed the
Agency for "inappropriate" items such as business cards, parking
fees, and office plants. 141 The report concluded that EPA had failed
to conduct both effective contract administration and oversight. 142
The criticism continued into 1992. The EPA Inspector General blasted the Agency for its mismanagement of contractors and
its overreliance on contractors for administrative and technical
work in several of its programs. 143 Congressional and internal
Agency studies have found improper training of contractor employees, charges for "idle time," and improper reimbursements for such
items as Christmas parties and giftS.I44 Contractors have also improperly used taxpayer money for football tickets, alcohol at employee parties, beach houses, and corporate jets. 14S CH2M Hill,
EPA's largest private contractor, was charged with improperly billing $873,000 for corporate jets, $7700 for alcoholic beverages,
$4100 for tickets to professional sports events, $1636 for candy for
clients, and $483,900 in excessive employee relocation expenses. 146
139 Elliot Diringer, Congress to Probe Superfund: Investigators to Search for
Abuses by Contractors, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 8, 1991, at AI.
140 See generally CONTRACTING REpORT, supra note 24, at 1509-13.
141 Id. The report cautioned that these charges were not necessarily illegal. Id.
at 1508. An OMB study has proposed certification requinnents for contractors
working for civilian agencies that would allow the government to bring criminal
charges against contractors making false statements. See infra notes 246-50 and
accompanying text.
142 See CONTRACTING REpORT, supra note 24, at 1508.
143 See Gutfeld, supra note 49, at B8. See generally Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at passim.
144 See Gutfeld, supra note 49, at B8. See generally Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, atpassim. See also Oversight Needed, supra note 44 (summarizing testimony at congressional hearing detailing contractor abuses at EPA).
145 Neus & Willette, supra note 48, at A6.
146 Anne Willette, Company Defends Its Record, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug.
3, 1992, at A6. See also Keith Schneider, Company Accused of Bilking U.S. on
Waste Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at A34 (GAO charges CH2M Hill of
overbilling $2.3 million; $11,739 for Christmas party, $2750 for specialty chocolates, $453 for party balloons, and $65 for rental of a reindeer suit for children's
party). CH2M Hill has also been charged with overbilling the Agency $21 million
from 1987 through 1989 because the company failed to separate costs that are
ineligible for government payment. Willette, supra, at A6. Representative Mike
Synar, (D)-Oklahoma, questions the practice of some Superfund contractors giving
the government a "voluntary management reduction" to catch unallowable expenses inadvertently included in their cost pools. See Acquisition Management.
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CH2M Hill responded that its "preferred customer" rate protected
the government from overcharges. 147 As a result, an EPA committee launched to examine contracting activities has recommended a
"total overhaul" of the Agency's contract program.148 Although
the abusive contractor billing suggests these contractors influence
Superfund policy, it alone does not prove that contractors significantly influence the Superfund program.

3. Conflicts of Interest with PRPs
There are potential conflicts of interest when EPA and PRPs
hire the same contractors, as they often dO. 149 In 1989, a Senate
subcommittee report charged that key EPA policy decisions were
being made by private consulting firms that simultaneously represent polluters that are subject to EPA regulation. ISO Senator Pryor,
the subcommittee's chairperson, criticized the Agency for allowing
consultants to establish policy and for failing to prevent conflicts of
interest. lSI
EPA has not ignored conflicts of interest. In response to the
Senate subcommittee's criticism, and fearing that conflicts of interest by contractors could taint the Agency's efforts to recover
cleanup costs from PRPs, lS2 EPA drafted a rule regulating conflicts
of interest by Superfund contractors. lS3 The Hazardous Waste Action Coalition, a lIS-member contractor group, has criticized the
proposed rule, charging that there was no evidence of significant
OFPP Plans Major Changes in Civilian Agency Contracting. Audit Practices-Inadequate Agency Supervision Faulted at Dingell Hearing, S8 Fed. Conts. Rep. (BNA)
21 d3 (Dec. 7, 1992)[hereinafter OFPP Plans].
147 Willette. supra note 146.
148 Gutfeld, supra note 49, at B8.
149 Public Comment, supra note 79, at 1931.
ISO EPA Policy Decisions Made By Private Finns With Little Agency Control,
Senate Panel Told, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2107 (Feb. 10, 1989)[hereinafter EPA
Policy].
lSI Id. Infra section Ill.A.4. will discuss policy decisions that Superfund contractors were or are making on behalf of the Agency. Part IV will examine proposed legislation designed to prevent contractors from making EPA policy
decisions.
152

See EPA Contractors Criticize Proposed Super/und Conflicts ofInterest Rule,

21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 534 (July 7, 1990)[hereinafter EPA Contractors](EPA official
states stricter conflict of interest rules needed to protect Agency suits against
PRPs).
153 See Acquisition Regulation Concerning Conflicts of Interest, S5 Fed. Reg.
17,724 (1990)(proposed Apr. 26, 1990). See also EPA Contractors, supra note IS2,
at 534 (EPA proposed rule because of Senator Pyror's criticisms and fear contractors could taint cost recovery against PRPs).
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conflicts of interest that had impaired the Agency's recovery of
costs from PRPS.IS4 In 1991, EPA was again criticized for not
resolving the conflict of interest problem and for failing to issue the
conflict of interest rule. ISS
If contractors representing PRPs were also exercising significant influence over EPA Superfund policy, one would expect the
Agency to emphasize low-cost cleanup strategies which benefit
PRPs. Indeed, s.ome evidence indicates that EPA does emphasize
cleanup remedies that are less expensive than what SARA mandates. lS6 Yet, contrary to this expectation is the reality that contractors, as self-interested parties, desire inflated costs and
expensive cleanups to assure more work and higher profits. Under
this assumption, contractors representing PRPs would not necessarily push EPA to emphasize low-cost cleanups.
There is no conclusive proof that contractors influence EPA to
raise or lower costs. Overall, however, contractors probably have a
greater self-interest in persuading EPA to undertake expensive
remedial actions, although it is difficult to determine to what extent
contractors convince the Agency to adopt more expensive approaches or simply reinforce EPA's own protective tendencies. ls7

4. Ideological Capture
Perhaps the most distressing form of agency capture is ideological.
Ideological capture occurs when an agency believes that
what is good for the regulated industry is good for America. IS9 Has
the Superfund program been ideologically captured? While classic
ISS

See EPA Contractors, supra note 152, at 534.
See GAO Blasts EPA on Contract Management, Indemnification, Conflicts of
Interest, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1649, 1650 (Nov. I, 1991).
156 See supra note 123-27 and accompanying text.
157 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
154
ISS

158 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite explain ideological capture in the following
terms: In a capture model, through lobbying the regulated firm is able to win the
hearts and minds of the regulators. In a sense capture is achieved as the lobbying
causes the regulators to care about different things. At the captured extreme the
regulators think that "what is good for GM is good for America." AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 63. Similarly, a social psychology explanation of
ideological capture suggests that regulators are likely to identify after many years
with the people they deal with more than anyone else, members of the regulated
industry. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 65-66.
159 See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing capture of ICC by railroad
industry; "[h]aving lived in the railroads for twenty years, it is easy to see how an
ICC bureaucrat could come to believe that the railroads needed lots of carrots and
no sticks").
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"capture" theory is limited to regulatory agencies and industries,
Professor Wilson argues that nonregulated interest groups have reason to develop "client relationships" with, and shape the views of,
government agencies that provide funding for them or can otherwise serve their interests (although he does not specifically address
the issue of whether a dominant "client group" can ideologically
capture a "client agency").l60
In the context of the Superfund program, it may be even more
important for nonregulated interest groups to capture the hearts
and minds of EPA regulators because determining what are the
most appropriate cleanup methods for a given site presents more
complex and ambiguous issues than does establishing railroad
rates. 161 There is so much disagreement about how EPA should
conduct the Superfund program-and thus disagreement of what is
the baseline "public interest"-that it is probably impossible to develop a quantitative approach, such as conducting social science
surveys of Agency staff for measuring the extent to which various
interest groups influence EPA or abuse their "client relationships."
This Article will attempt a qualitative assessment to answer some of
these questions.
5. Are Superfund Contractors a Dependent Bureaucracy?

The strongest evidence that Superfund contractors have captured, or at least exercise undue influence over, the Superfund program is the amount and type of work the Agency delegates to the
contractors. As discussed in Section I.B., Congress and EPA initially determined that private contractors, rather than an enlarged
EPA staff, should implement the "short-run" Superfund program.
By 1986, it was clear that the program might take decades and cost
hundreds of billions of dollars. Still, the Agency continued to rely
on contractors to perform the bulk of the cleanup work. 162 During
the 1980s, EPA spent between eighty and ninety percent of its
Superfund program budget, approximately $4 billion, on private
contractors. 163
160 See WILSON, supra note 1, at 80. For example. Wilson argues that research
professors have developed client relationships with the National Academy of Sciences and National Science Foundation. Id.
161 See generally supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (baseline for determining undue influence by interest groups is more complex for Superfund cleanup
remedies than railroad rates).
162 See OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 1-3.
163 Id. at 3-4.
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This excessive reliance is not entirely the Agency's fault. Congress and the Executive Branch have failed to provide EPA with the
staff and resources necessary to manage the Superfund program. l64
In fact, the Agency has not received an increase (in constant dollar
terms) in funding for its staff to offset the increased burdens of the
Superfund program. 16S
Contractors handle many tasks, they: analyze cleanup technologies; perform risk assessments; identify feasible cleanup alternatives; draft Records of Decision; design cleanups; and perform the
physical work of cleaning up Superfund sites. Although a single
contractor generally does not conduct all of these tasks, the scope of
these undertakings demonstrate that contractors are involved in
every facet of the Superfund program. Because of the broad scope
of contractor involvement, contractors can influence EPA policy
decisions. Indeed, OTA found that contractors do make policy decisions. 166 For example, contractors determine whether a site needs
cleaning, and, if so, whether the site qualifies for a fund-financed
cleanup.167 Also, contractors were involved in developing both the
NCP and the guidance documents that implement the NCP.168
OTA essentially charged that contractors had captured the
Superfund program: "Contractors conduct so many program activities that, taken as a whole, the contracting industry has enormous
influence over Superfund, perhaps more than Congress, the public,
environmental groups, the news media and other institutions."169
Contractor influence stems, in part, from private sector salaries.
Because contractors generally pay higher salaries than the Agency,
contractors frequently hire technically experienced former EPA
staff. 170 High EPA staff turnover impedes EPA supervision of contractors and drains Agency expertise. l7l As a result, OTA asserts
that contractors, presumably because of their expertise, provide
most of the information and analysis for key initial policy drafts. 172
OTA's study suggested that Superfund contractors wish to perpetuate the program because "the contracting industry has become
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

171
\72

See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
See OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 3-4.
See generally id.
ld. at 12.
ld.
ld. at 2.
See id. at 32.
ld. at 32-33.
ld. at 12.
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a constituency benefiting from a large Superfund program."173 To
that extent, Superfund contractors have interests contrary to PRPs,
who obviously wish to minimize the cost and scope of the program.
OTA recommended that an independent group study whether
PRPs should begin to conduct more cleanups,174 implying that
Superfund contractors would disfavor more PRP involvement. 17s
Finally, OTA claimed that Superfund contractors have grown
into a "dependent bureaucracy" which exerts pressure for permanence and expansion as would an internal bureaucracy, but remains
less subject to government control and public scrutiny.176 The
study noted, for example, that EPA pays for contractors to attend
Superfund conventions, conferences, and trade shows. l77 In 1989,
EPA spent $210,000 to send more than eighty contractor representatives to a two day orientation session in Dallas. 178 It is unlikely
that either Congress or EPA desire a "dependent bureaucracy."
Perhaps this outcome is tolerable to the Agency and the public because the PRPs ultimately foot most of the bill.
Unfortunately, OTA's study did not lead to major changes in
EPA contractor practices. 179 In a July 1992 hearing concerning the
collapse of contract management at EPA, Representative Dingell
denounced the Agency and its Administrator for allowing contractors to play such a major role in both shaping EPA policy and running the Agency.lSO
OTA's study is probably the best evidence that Superfund contractors exercise such strong influence over Superfund policy that
they may have captured the program. Before concluding that contractors have captured the Superfund program, other groups which
may influence the program must be considered, namely PRPs, the
hazardous waste treatment industry, environmental public interest
groups, and Congress.
173 Id. at 6.
174Id.
175 Id. at 7.
176 See id. at
177 See id. at

43.
43-44.
178 Michael Weisskopf, supra note 134, at AI.
179 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
180 See Collapse afContract Management, supra note 44, at 325-26 (statement of
Representative Dingell regarding role of all EPA contractors, not just Superfund
contractors).
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The Public's and PRPs' Interests in Contractor Management

Recall Professors Dwyer and Lazarus' contention that strong
public interest, inter alia, has prevented the capture of EPA. lSI
This contention may be inaccurate because the public may have little interest in EPA management of its programs and its contractors.
Rather, the public's interest probably stops at concerns about the
quality of the environment. So long as the publicized sites are
cleaned, the public most likely has little interest in the specifics of
EPA implementation. Also, when PRPs, as opposed to the
Superfund, are paying the bill, the public may be less concerned
about contractor excesses.
One would expect that PRPs have a keen interest in controlling contractor expenses because they bear the contractors' financial
burden. PRPs, however, have other interests which may impede
efforts to lower EPA contractor abuses. First, PRPs are often more
concerned with suing other PRPs than they are with reforming the
Superfund contractor system. Second, as Professor Marc Landy
and Mary Hague argue, PRPs are too disunited to lobby Congress
effectively for change. 1S2 That PRPs have been ineffective lobbyists
might be accurate. But their failure may be more a result of their
unpopularity than their disunity. Indeed, PRPs are often industrial
Fortune 500 corporations. lS3 Presumably, these giant corporations
and their trade associations are well organized and have access to
congressional decisionmakers.
Superfund contractors alone are no match for major PRPs
when it comes to influencing Agency policy. Thus, fully understanding the role of contractors in influencing EPA policy and possibly capturing the Superfund program requires an examination of
the relationships among contractors, the hazardous waste treatment
industry, and public interest groups.

B.

The Hazardous Waste Treatment Industry

Landy and Hague argue that the Superfund program primarily
benefits environmental groups, lawyers, and the hazardous waste
treatment industry.lS4 In particular, they argue that an "unholy aISee discussion supra section II.A.
See Marc K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition/or Waste: Private Interests and Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 67 (Michael S. Greve et al. eds., 1992).
183 See CHURCH, supra note 12, at 110.
184 See Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 77.
181

182
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liance" exists between the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
(HWTC), which they claim. advocates permanent treatment solutions on behalf of its members, and environmental groups.1 8S
HWTC broke away from another contractors' organization because
that organization represented landfill operators, and landfilling is
not a permanent solution to the hazardous waste problem in the
eyes of HWTC.186
In 1988, HWTC and several environmental groups, including
the Environmental Defense Fund, the National Audubon Society,
the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the
United States Public Interest Research Group, published a report
criticizing the Superfund program for favoring containment remedies over permanent cleanups.187 In 1990, the same coalition issued
a report which again criticized EPA for relying too heavily on containment strategies. 188 It is based on these reports that Landy and
Hague argue that HWTC and environmental groups have formed
an alliance designed to promote the Agency's adoption of expensive
permanent cleanup strategies. 189
Landy and Hague do not specifically address agency capture,
but their arguments suggest that the hazardous waste treatment industry, in conjunction with environmental groups, have captured or
unduly influence the Superfund program. On the other hand, Professor Lazarus argues that the pollution control equipment industry
would help block any regulated industry attempts to capture the
Agency.190 Landy and Hague turn that argument on its head, contending that the pollution control industry might capture the
Agency in order to overregulate industry and that an alliance with
185 Id. at 78-81. HWTC does not represent all Superfund cantractors, but primarily those who perform treatment rather than cantainment or disposal. Id. at
78.

186 Id.
187 See OTA AssESSMENT, supra note 5, at 28 n.30j Landy & Hague, supra note
182, at 79. The study was titled RIGHT TRAIN, WRONG TRACK: FAILED LEADERSHIP IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM.
188 See Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 79. The report was titled TRACKING
SUPERFUND.
189 See Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 78-81. Cf. OTA AssESSMENT, supra
note 5, at 28 (Remedial Contractors Council seeks to "clean up" Superfund cantracting industry by driving out "dirt" cantractors that are unable to perform
proper remedial work). HWTC would have similar interests as the Remedial Contractors Council in promoting Superfund cantractors who utilize the technology
sold by its members and in criticizing cantractors who do not.
190 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 365.
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environmental groups allows HWTC to do SO.191 Landy and Hague
do not present convincing evidence, however, that these groups
have captured EPA. In fact, that these groups exert some influence
over the Agency is hardly surprising or inappropriate.
Landy and Hague do imply that there is something wrong with
the hazardous waste treatment industry or environmentalists trying
to convince EPA to use permanent treatment methods at more
sites, but they fail to discuss the statutory grounds that support permanent solutions. SARA favors permanent treatment solutions,
although the statute gives the Agency considerable discretion in
weighing costs and other factors when determining cleanup
levels. 192 The term "capture" is not appropriate where an agency is
simply implementing a statutory mandate. 193
In seeking to discredit SARA's permanent treatment approach, Landy and Hague claim that the environmentalists who secured SARA's enactment are part of a "Public Lobby" based upon
a New Left ideology which is hostile to business. 194 The environmentalists, it is argued, supported provisions in SARA which serve
the movement's broader antibusiness political agenda. 19S Yet,
Landy and Hague fail to identify clearly who belongs to the "Public
Lobby." They also fail to acknowledge that environmental groups
are increasingly willing to work with business to promote common
goals. Their argument that HWTC and environmentalists have
formed an alliance is adverse to their contention that environmentalists are ideologically biased against all business interests.
The preference for expensive, permanent cleanup remedies embedded in SARA's legislative process, Landy and Hague further assert, is fundamentally misguided. Yet, Landy and Hague fail to
consider seriously whether the public simply wanted a greater degree of safety than they think is worthwhile. Landy and Hague also
fail to acknowledge the considerable disagreement among experts
concerning which types of cleanup techniques are appropriate. Fi191

192

See generally Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 78·81.
42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1988)(preference for permanent treatment). See also

supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. Landy and Hague are aware that
SARA establishes a preference for permanent remediation of Superfund sites; yet,
they fail to consider whether that statutory preference might justify the lobbying
efforts of the hazardous waste treatment industry or environmentalists, groups of
which Landy and Hague are perhaps overly eager to criticize. See generally Landy
& Hague, supra note 182, at 73·81.
193 See WILSON, supra note I, at 75·76.
194 See Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 75·76.
195 ld. at 75.
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nally, despite their claim that PRPs are too disunited to lobby Congress effectively, Landy and Hague undervalue the influence of the
trade associations that lobby on behalf of PRPs. According to
Landy and Hague, only the American International Group (AIG),
the largest underwriter of commercial and industrial insurance in
the United States, has mounted a major effort to eliminate PRP liability (AIG urges replacing PRP liability with cleanups financed
through a broad-based insurance fund).196 Landy and Hague criticize this proposal for its failure to address societal overinvestment
in hazardous waste cleanups.197 They maintain that EPA is aware
that Superfund's public health benefits are negligible relative to the
program's enormous costs. 198 The Agency, they claim, supported
CERCLA's enactment in order to gain additional resources. l99
However, they assert that the program is no longer a political asset
for EPA because the public and Congress blame the Agency for the
sluggish pace of cleanups.2oo In a rare optimistic comment, Landy
and Hague express hope that EPA will admit to the public that
Superfund is a huge waste of money, but conclude that this is unlikely because EPA would have to both challenge the powerful constituencies that support Superfund and upset the Agency's funding
for the program.201
Ultimately, Landy and Hague imply that the environmental
movement and HWTC have duped the public and Congress into
believing that permanent cleanups are necessary.202 They argue
that PRPs will not be able to influence successfully the future of
CERCLA policy-making unless they overcome the "public hysteId. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
198 See id. at 71,83. Although EPA believes that the environmental and health
risks posed by hazardous waste sites are less than the risks posed by, for instance,
pesticide residues, the statute requires the Agency to spend far more on the former.
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPARING RIsKS AND SETIlNG
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS 6265 (1989); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE AssESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 77-78, 84-86, 91-99
(1987). See also Applegate, supra note 50, at 279 n.4 (discussing EPA studies cited
in this footnote); Lester B. Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 309-11 (1989)(discussing studies showing that regulatory expenditures do not correlate with greater risk).
199 Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 71-72.
200 See id. at 71-72, 82-83.
201 Id. at 82-83.
202 See id. at 82-84.
196

197
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ria" over "ticking time bombs."203 They assert that the public will
not understand the excessive costs of these cleanups until taxpayers
have to foot the bill. 204 Landy and Hague advocate decentralizing
the Superfund program by allocating monies to individual states for
budgets based on individual site cleanup costs. 20S
C. Structural Incentives

Professor Wilson argues that maritime carriers were able to
"capture" the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) because the
Commission was burdened with too much paperwork and had to
regulate in an environment where carriers' proposed rates were
rarely challenged. 206 He contends that these structural incentives
allowed carriers to capture the FMC without using bribes or offering lucrative jobs to former government employees. 207 The FMC
simply entered a reactive mode in which it approved most rate
requests. 208
Structural incentives, not an unholy alliance, are a better explanation of why contractors have such a large role in managing the
Superfund program and why the program might err on the side of
expensive cleanup remedies. A structural incentive that increases
Superfund contractors' role in policy decisions is the lack of funding
for all necessary EPA staff. 209 As discussed above, contractors, by
hiring many experts who might otherwise work for EPA, employ
much of the expertise needed to implement the program. 210 A possible desire on the part of EPA staff to please prospective employers
is not, however, a source of contractor influence. As Professors
Lazarus and Wilson assert, EPA professional staff with significant
experience will be hired by industry for their skills despite any antiindustry positions taken while at the Agency.211 If the Agency is to
escape dependence upon contractors, Congress must provide EPA
with more resources to pay higher salaries.
Although contractors may advocate relatively expensive per203 Id. They do acknowledge, however, that some of the alleged "public hysteria" has subsided. Id. at 83.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 83-84.
206 See WILSON, supra note 1, at 75.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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manent cleanups, structural incentives would likely have pushed
EPA in the same direction anyway. First, parties, including EPA,
are more likely to spend excessively on cleanups if the money is
someone else's. Second, EPA has a political incentive to be protective in choosing remedies, particularly in light of SARA's preference for permanent cleanups. Landy and Hague may be correct
that HWTC and environmental groups lobby for permanent remedial solutions. Again, however, EPA probably would have adopted
similar policies on its own.

D. Arguments that Superfund Has Not Been Captured
It is debatable whether contractors have captured the

Superfund program. One could argue that EPA's adoption of the
Enforcement First strategy, which was followed by an increase in
PRP cleanups, would not have occurred had contractors captured
the program. However, contractors continue to play a significant
role in overseeing PRP cleanups.212 Also, capturing the Superfund
program is more difficult to conceptualize because that program
represents just one part of a large government agency-EPAwhich, as a whole, has not been captured. Capture would probably
require that the program be sufficiently independent from central,
uncaptured control. Such independence is unlikely; congressional
subcommittees pay considerable attention to the Superfund program and pressure EPA's leadership to monitor Superfund
abuses. 213
Absent an increase in resources, central control by Congress or
EPA's top leadership may be insufficient to overcome structural incentives favoring the use of contractors in policymaking roles.
Also, central oversight may not be sufficient to overcome a possible
"bias" in favor of permanent cleanups. That PRPs and special
taxes replenish the Superfund, and that most feel it is safer to err on
the side of protection, exacerbates the problem. Professor Wilson
suggests that congressional investigations of the FMC did little to
overcome the structural biases favoring carriers.214 Thus, if Congress wants to reduce the role of Superfund contractors, it must
change the structural incentives.
212
213

See supra notes 16-18, 30, 48, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47, 139, 144, 150.51, 180, and accompanying text; discussion

infra section III.F.
214 See WILSON, supra note 1, at 74-75.
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The Public

Having discussed the role of EPA, PRPs, Superfund contractors, HWTC, and organized environmental public interest groups in
shaping Superfund policy, this Article will now look at the role of
the general public.21s Citizens living near a Superfund site naturally
want the most expensive and low-risk cleanups because they receive
all the benefits while paying little of the costs. The tendency of citizens to demand the safest cleanup favors the permanent treatment
orientation of HWTC and environmental interest groups. However, the general public is unlikely to invest time tracking
Superfund contractor expenditures as long as PRPs or the special
taxes replenish the Superfund and pay the bills. Still, John and Jane
Citizen are likely to be outraged by huge cost overruns for candy
bars and sports tickets.
CERCLA originally favored expert decision making over public involvement. 216 The statute had few provisions for formal public
participation in the cleanup process and did not authorize citizen
suits. 217 Although the public could participate in general rulemaking proceedings, the statute did not provide for public participation
in proceedings which addressed cleanup decisions concerning specific sites. 218 Nor did the statute specifically provide for citizen participation in negotiations or enforcement proceedings with PRPS.219
SARA changed this, requiring public notice and comment on
Superfund cleanup plans. 220 To empower citizens, SARA autho21S Some readers may wonder whether this discussion of agency capture ignores
the impact of individual leaders in directing an agency's policies. organizational
operations, and culture. Without question, leaders are important. For example.
commentators frequently argue that EPA, under Anne (Gorsuch) Burford. Administrator from 1981 to 1983, enforced its statutory mandates far less aggressively
than it has subsequently. Also, Professors Elliott and Ackerman argue that the
strong 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments resulted from political competition between President Nixon and Senator Muskie, then a strong contender for the Democratic 1972 presidential nomination. The competition led both politicians to
propose stronger legislation than either really desired so each could claim the environmental mandate. Thus, leaders do matter, but structural problems resulting
from statutory mandates, organizational realities, and funding shortages have a
larger impact. See E. Donald Elliott et aI., Toward a Theory of Statutory E~'o/u
tion: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EeoN. & ORG. 313. 335-38
(1985).
216 See Folk, supra note 114, at 181.
217 [d. at 193.
218 [d.
219 [d. Courts have split on the issue of intervention by citizen groups. [d. at
193-94 n.131 (discussing cases).
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988). See also Folk, supra note 114, at 194 (discuss-
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rizes technical assistance grants (TAGs) for any group of individuals that might be affected by a release or threatened release from an
NPL facility.221 SARA also authorizes citizen suits. 222
Ellison Folk argues that the public plays a relatively passive
role in the Superfund decision-making process.223 He maintains
that, despite their differences, EPA, PRPs, and contractors have developed a "professional camaraderie" in which they oppose increased public involvement that could diminish their respective
roles in the cleanup process.224 Folk also asserts that EPA staff
members usually believe that they can effectively represent the public's interests without significant public participation.22S As a result, EPA generally discourages public participation in negotiations
with PRPs over cleanup plans.226
Public concerns may playa larger role during the Clinton Administration than they did during the Reagan-Bush era. Vice President Gore, for instance, has backed citizens who oppose the
construction of a hazardous waste incinerator in East Liverpool,
Ohio.227 If public participation increased, how would it affect the
Superfund process? Folk suggests that EPA and PRPs are biased
towards least-costly options, whereas the public often prefers the
permanent and more expensive cleanup solutions.228

F. Congress
Congress has sent mixed signals regarding the management of
the Superfund program. While it has helped identify contractor
ing SARA's public notice and comment provisions).
221 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)(I) (1988). See also Folk, supra note 114, at 194-95 (discussing TAGs). Before SARA, however, EPA had created a Superfund Community Relations Program. Folk, supra note 114, at 195-99.
222 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988).
223 See Folk, supra note 114, at 213.
224 Id. at 213-14.
22S Id. at 214.
226 Id. at 214 n.262. The Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model (SACM) program may decrease public participation because less participation is required for
removal than for remedial actions, and SACM emphasizes removals. Lawrence,
supra note 16, at 2965. EPA, however, has the discretion to exceed the community
relations requirements in the NCP, or to use remedial action procedures at sites
with high public or state interest, even if a nontime-critical removal action would
result in a faster cleanup. Id. at 2965. Ultimately, EPA must decide how to balance the potentially contradictory goals of quicker cleanups and allowing the public sufficient opportunity for input into cleanup decisions.
227 Timothy Noah, Gore Vows to Block Incinerator Start-Up, Suggesting He'l!
Play an Activist Role, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1992, at B6.
228 See Folk, supra note 114, at 184-85.
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abuses, Congress is partly responsible for cutting the budget for
government auditors and allowing the increase in private contractor
participation. 229
Although Congress has played a constructive role in monitoring how effectively agencies manage their private contractors,230
Professor Lazarus criticizes congressional oversight of EPA. He asserts that various subcommittees make conflicting demands on the
Agency and that the process wastes significant Agency resources.231
Still, Congress, in conjunction with OTA and GAO, has played a
critical role in uncovering contractor abuses. 232 Because Congress
can change structural incentives, major reforms in management of
EPA contractors would likely come through Congress. While there
is always the possibility that contractors can and will lobby Congress to preserve their favored position,233 existing evidence suggests that Congress can effectively push contractor reforms at EPA.
Professor Lazarus and others note, however, that Congress has
often failed to provide sufficient appropriations for EPA to carry
out its statutory mandates. 234 While the Reagan and Bush adminis229 Compare Dan Morgan, Administration Supports Penalties for Overbilling,·
OMB Official Testifies/or Contractor Sanctions, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1992, at A10

(beginning in 1991 Congress has become increasingly critical of management of
federal programs, including monitoring of private contractors); OFPP Plans, supra
note 146, at 21 d3 (Representative Dingell criticizes Bush administration for relying too heavily on private contractors and opposing efforts of his committee to hire
more auditors) with Keith Schneider,
Says Lack of Supervision Encouraged
Waste in Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at AI, C20 [hereinafter
Says](Congress shares blame because it approved administration budgets slashing
auditors and increasing private contractors until 1992).
230 See Morgan, supra note 229, at A8 (discussing congressional efforts to investigate contractor abuses and government mismanagement in early 19905).
231 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional

u.s.

u.s.

Oversight 0/ EPA: Quis Custodiet /psos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers
Themselves)?, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 205-39 (1991). Lazarus acknowledges that oversight can be valuable in checking agency abuses. Id.
232 See supra notes 47, 139, 150-51, 180, 228-31, and accompanying text.
233 "Public choice" theory asserts that interest groups in some circumstances
may capture or exercise undue influence in Congress to obtain legislation favorable
to its interests at the expense of the public good. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991)(examining evidence supporting public choice hypothesis and discussing its
"republican" critics).
234 Congress consistently provides EPA less money than the Agency needs to
carry out its ambitious statutory mandates. In fact, congressional appropriations
in constant dollar terms have declined since the inauguration of President Reagan
in 1981 (although there have been some modest increases since 1985). See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 329-30. See also sources cited in supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Congress frequently saddles EPA with onerous responsibilities when
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trations might have been responsible for many of the problems, it
was Congress that approved administration budgets that provided
for the elimination of many government jobs and the significant
privatization of government.23S
IV
SOLUTIONS TO THE PREDICAMENT

This section examines the following potential solutions to the
Superfund contractor morass: judicial review; improved auditing;
proposed legislation that would restrict contractors' ability to act in
policy making roles for EPA; and incentive contracts designed to
increase efficiency.
A. Judicial Review
Some commentators argue in favor of "meaningful" judicial review of EPA's response costs when the Agency brings cost recovery
actions against PRPS.236 On the other hand, three government attorneys argued that judicial review of EPA's cost recovery actions
against PRPs wastes time because courts almost always conclude
that the Agency has adequately documented its expenses.237 This
Article contends that there are broad policy arguments for rejecting
expanded judicial review as a panacea to cure excessive contractor
it enacts grand statutes purporting to save the nation's environment. However,
Congress often undercuts the Agency in the less publicized appropriations process,
which is under the jurisdiction of different congressional committees than those
that propose environmental legislation. See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 328-30.
23S See u.s. Says, supra note 229, at AI, C20.
236 See Robert H. Fuhrman & David B. Hird, EPA Proposed Rule on Superfund
Cost Recovery: Streamlining or Steamrolling, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1438, 1438-42
(Sept. 18, 1992); Brantly, supra note 12, at 970-71. CERCLA makes PRPs liable
for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.c.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). Thus, whether EPA is entitled to recover its response
costs depends on whether its cleanup actions are "not inconsistent with the
[NCP]." On August 6,1992, EPA proposed a rule amending certain provisions of
the NCP and establishing new regulations on CERCLA cost recovery. Recovery
of Costs for CERCLA Response Actions, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,742 (1992)[hercinafter
Recovery of Costs]. See Fuhrman & Hird, supra (criticizing proposed rule). The
proposed rule would expand the NCP's definition of recoverable indirect costs,
apparently limit a defendant's ability to challenge costs on grounds that they are
inconsistent with the NCP, and restrict the types of documentation that EPA must
provide to PRPs. See generally Cost Reco~'ery, supra note 136, at 34,744-51; Fuhrman & Hird, supra (criticizing provisions relating to indirect costs, PRP cost challenges, and documentation).
237 See Beehler et al., supra note 38, at 10,763-77.
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costs. While there are reasonable due process and statutory arguments in favor of vigorous judicial review of Agency expenses when
EPA sues PRPs in cost recovery actions,238 as a practical matter,
aggressive judicial review attacks only the most flagrant Superfund
contractor abuses. This is because courts tend to defer to the
Agency's technical judgments with respect to the selection and implementation of cleanup remedies. 239 Congressional reform of the
aUditing and contracting process could achieve a more comprehensive solution.
On December 3, 1992, the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy for OMB testified before a House subcommittee on the subject of an OMB initiated report prepared by OMB
and auditors from twelve major civilian agencies, including EPA. 240
The report, titled "Summary Report of the SWAT Team on Civilian
Agency Contracting" (SWAT Report), found that federal agencies
may have wasted vast amounts of money because they failed to supervise the thousands of private companies that were doing much of
the government's work.241 The SWAT Report, the first comprehensive study by the White House on mismanagement in federal contracting, is a major critique of the Reagan and Bush
administrations' aggressive efforts to shift public work to the private
sector.242 The report implicitly questions the notion that private
contractors perform government work more efficiently than the
government. 243 The report reveals that the Reagan and Bush ad238 See generally Fuhnnan & Hird, supra note 236, at 1438-42 (arguing in favor
of vigorous judicial review of EPA expenses in cost recovery actions against PRPs);
Brantly, supra note 12, at 970-71, 980 (same). But see Beehler et aI., supra note 38,
at 10,763-77.
239 One commentator who favors "meaningful" judicial review of EPA expenses
concedes that courts must give considerable deference to EPA's technical judgments, but contends that courts should deny recovery of costs where "no technical
judgment is necessary to detennine whether implementation has been cost·effective." Brantly, supra note 12, at 986·87. This solution is not practical because
technica1judgments are important in most major decisions EPA makes about remedy selection and implementation.
240 See Morgan, supra note 229, at AlO; OFPP Plans, supra note 146.
241 See Keith Schneider, For the Government, Contractors Have Special Rates,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at E2 [hereinafter For the Government];
Says,
supra note 229, at AI.
242 See For the Government, supra note 241, at 2; U.S. Says, supra note 229. at
AI, C20.
243 Compare For the Government, supra note 241, at 2 (OMB report casts serious
doubts on Reagan and Bush administrations' privatization policies) with Editorial.
No Proof on Privatization, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 4, 1992. at Al6 (while
OMB report found billions of dollars in waste, study does not prove using govern-

u.s.
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ministrations were penny wise and pound foolish: the administrations saved millions of dollars by hiring fewer auditors but allowed
potentially billions of dollars of waste by failing to properly supervise thousands of contractors.244
The SWAT Report proposed a number of reforms. One proposal was to place the Defense Contract Audit Agency, which has the
most experience in monitoring the costs of private contracts, in
charge of monitoring all federal contractors.24S Additionally, the
report proposed extending to civilian agencies the certification and
penalty provisions currently imposed by the Department of Defense
to assure that indirect cost submissions by private firms include
only allowable costs.246 The certification requirement would authorize the government to bring criminal charges against contractors who make false statements.247 The penalty provisions would
authorize the government to impose a penalty equal to or sometimes double the amount of the disallowed expense.248 Presently,
contractors are usually required to pay back only disallowed expenses.249 Furthermore, the OMB official testifying suggested that
the costs of conducting audits be included in the contract.2SO
If Congress, after EPA improves its auditing system, believes
that expanded judicial review is still necessary, special administrative law judges should be used to conduct the initial review of such
issues. Federal district judges lack the time and expertise to effectively second guess the Agency's remedy selection and implementation decisions.
ment employees would have been more efficient).
244 See Editorial, u.s. Called Off Its Fiscal Watchdogs, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Dec. 7, 1992, at A12 [hereinafter u.s. Called Offl("But the millions of dollars that
can be saved by hiring fewer auditors doesn't begin to offset the billions of dollars
that are lost as a result."); For the Government, supra note 241, at 2 ("A central
reason for the mismanagement, said the report, was the policy of cutting the
number of Federal auditors while the number and value of contracts was
soaring.").
245 See Morgan, supra note 229, at AS; u.s. Says, supra note 229, at AI, C20;
OFPP Plans, supra note 146.
246 See OFPP Plans, supra note 146.
247 See Morgan, supra note 229, at A10.
248 See id. (discussing penalty provisions); u.s. Says, supra note 229, at C20
(federal officials stated contractors charge government for questionable costs because there is usually no penalty other than paying back money).
249 See Morgan, supra note 229, at AlO; u.s. Says, supra note 229, at C20.
250 See OFPP Plans, supra note 146 (testimony of Allan Burman, Administrator
of Office of Federal Procurement Policy for OMB before House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Dec. 3, 1992).
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B. Limiting Contractor Functions
In addition to mandating improved aUditing of contractor billing, Congress should consider reducing the number of contractors
the Agency employs and should rethink the types of jobs they are
allowed to perform. EPA, mainly a regulatory agency rather than a
public works agency, does not have the staffing to adequately perform or oversee cleanups.2s1 Congress must provide the Agency
more resources before the Agency can reduce its dependence on
contractors. Congress should also enact legislation which carefully
defines the roles of EPA staff and contractors. Without action,
EPA's contractor management problems will not be solved. 2s2
Congress has considered new legislation which would establish
a new cabinet-level Department of the Environment, prohibit contractors from performing inherently governmental functions such as
formulating and analyzing policy options, and restrict contractor
conflicts of interest. 2S3 Regardless of whether Congress acts on
such proposals, it should enact provisions which prohibit contractors from performing policy functions and which tighten conflict of
interest rules.
The proposed legislation does not adequately limit the role of
contractors in supervising remedial work. A 1990 Senate Report by
251 See Mank, supra note 7, at 259 n.128; Balcke, supra note 11, at 135 n.68.
EPA does function as a public works agency in issuing grants to Publicly Owned
Treatment Works under the Clean Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (1988).
252 On July 8, 1992, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a hearing on the "Collapse of
Contract Management at the EPA." See generally Collapse o/Contract Management, supra note 44, atpassim; Oversight Needed, supra note 44. Then EPA Administrator William Reilly pledged that the Agency would reform its general
contract management program and had already begun specifically addressing
problems with Superfund contractors, including cancelling one ACRS contract.
See generally Collapse o/Contract Management, supra note 44; Oversight Needed,
supra note 44. Representative John Dingell pointed out that EPA had failed in the
past to solve identified problems with contract management and expressed skepticism about whether the Agency would actually implement fundamental reforms in
its contract management. See Collapse o/Contract Management, supra note 44, at
467-68; Oversight Needed, supra note 44.
253 See S. 533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 113 (1991)(passed Senate on Oct. 1,
1991)(prohibiting contractors from performing inherently governmental functions
and restricting contractor conflicts of interest); H.R. REP. No. 428, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 34-37 (1990)(discussing § 115 of House Bill No. 3847, which would have
prohibited contractors from performing inherently governmental functions and restricted contractor conflicts of interest); S. REP. No. 262, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3740 (1990)(discussing § 211 of Senate Bill No. 2006, which would have prohibited
contractors from performing inherently governmental functions and restricted contractor conflicts of interest).
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the Committee on Government Affairs stated:
The Committee recognizes that certain EPA contracts provide
for contractors to supervise, coordinate, or integrate the non-policy work of other contractors and sub-contractors, such as in the
Alternative Remedial Construction Strategy (ACRS) program.
To the extent such activity facilitates and expedites the remedial
construction program, it is consistent with this subsection.2S4

The Committee today might have a more critical view of the ACRS
program in light of recent reports of contractor abuses and EPA's
own criticisms. At a minimum, EPA staff should supervise the
Agency contractors' work because such supervision inevitably affects the implementation of policy choices.
The Agency can reduce, to some extent, the role of Superfund
contractors by emphasizing a stronger Enforcement First strategy,
one that pushes for more PRP-performed cleanups.2Ss EPA's attempt to impose stringent consent decrees, however, may backfire
and cause PRPs to resist entering into settlements.256 Moreover,
many of the advantages of PRP-performed cleanups are lost when
Superfund contractors supervise PRP work.257 EPA should be provided with the resources to hire personnel who are qualified to supervise PRP cleanups. In this way, EPA would avoid employing a
different standard for review of government contracts than it does
for PRP work.258

C. Incentive Contracts
Traditionally, there are two varieties of government contracts.2S9 The most common are fixed-price contracts, where the
contractor agrees to perform specified work or deliver a product at
an agreed-upon price and the client agrees to pay the fixed price if
the contractor performs fully.260 Fixed-price contracts are best
suited for undertakings with relatively few technological and economic uncertainties, such as purchasing supplies and arranging for
routine construction services.261
S. REp. No. 262, supra note 253, at 38.
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 43, 85-88, and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
258 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
259 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.101(b) (1991); Stefan Reichelstein, Constructing Incenli.·e
Schemes for Government Contracts: An Application of Agency Theory, 67 AcCOUNTING REv. 712, 713 (1992); Brantly, supra note 12, at 988.
260 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-1 (1991); Brantly, supra note 12, at 988.
261 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-2 (1991); Reichelstein, supra note 259, at 713;
254

255
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In cost-reimbursement contracts, the contractor agrees to use
its best efforts to perform the specified work, and the client agrees to
reimburse the contractor for all of the contractor's "allowable"
costs, plus a fee. 262 Cost-reimbursement contracts, often referred to
as cost-plus contracts,263 are used when the work involves nonroutine services or products, the cost of which cannot be estimated accurately before the work is performed. 264 Because cost-plus
contracts create an incentive for contractors to pad costs,26S the
government often uses a mixed cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (which
fixes the contractor's profit allowance) in place of the standard costplus contract. 266
Because EPA's work is often on the cutting edge of technology,
it frequently uses cost reimbursable contracts, under which the
Agency pays for the contractor's time and materials rather than for
a definite product.267 In some cases, EPA has employed Superfund
contractors under cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts, under
which the contractor is reimbursed for all allowable costs plus a fee
consisting of two components: an initially agreed upon fixed "base
fee," plus an "award fee" determined by the Agency based upon its
evaluation of the contractor's performance. 268 CPAF contracts
seek to motivate "exceptional performance" in situations where objective incentives are infeasible and the extra costs the Agency incurs to evaluate the contractor's performance are ''justified by the
expected benefits."269
Despite good intentions, using these contracts has not eliminated contractor abuses. Specifically, two Inspector General audits
Brantly, supra note 12, at 988.
262 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.301 (1991); Brantly, supra note 12, at 988.
263 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-2 (1991); Brantly, supra note 12, at 988·89.
264 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.301·2 (1991); Brantly, supra note 12, at 988·89.
265 Reichelstein, supra note 259, at 713.
266 Id. Federal regulations require agencies to consider a number of factors,
including the complexity and risks associated with a project, the contractor's capi.
tal and equipment costs, and the degree of incentive necessary to motivate excellent
performance when negotiating fees designed to provide the contractor with a rea·
sonable profit. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 15.900·.905 (1991); Brantly, supra note 12, at 989.
267 See Collapse of Contract Management, supra note 44, at 342 (testimony of
John C. Martin, EPA Inspector General). See also Brantly, supra note 12, at 988·
89 (discussing cost·reimbursement contracts).
268 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.404-2 (1991)(defining CPAF contracts). See also
Brantly, supra note 12, at 995-98 (discussing use of CPAF contracts in Superfund
program); 48 C.F.R. § 1516.404-270 (1991)(providing regulations applicable to
CPAF contracts).
269 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.404-2(b)(I)(i-iii) (1991); Brantly, supra note 12, at 995.
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and one GAO report concluded that EPA had paid excessive award
fees and award fees for unsatisfactory performance.270 One commentator contends, however, that the total fees awarded by EPA to
the contractors, as reported in the GAO report, were not excessive
relative to those fees paid under the typical fixed-fee contract.271
The commentator argues that it is probably legal for the Agency to
give partial award fees to contractors who deliver less than satisfactory performance, although he maintains EPA violated regulations
concerning CPAF contracts in other respects.272 The legality of
EPA award procedures, however, is not at issue here. Rather, at
issue is the Agency's granting of partial awards to poorly performing contractors; this may reduce the contractors' incentive to perform well.
Recently, the government (especially the Defense Department)
has increased the use of contracts which control costs by basing the
contractor's profit on the extent to which it keeps costs below a
negotiated cost target.273 One concern with such contracts is the
difficulty of formulating realistic cost targets. 274 EPA should explore whether such incentive contracts are feasible. In the past,
there was probably too much uncertainty surrounding the costs of
cleaning up hazardous waste facilities to formulate cost targets.27S
270 See Brantly, supra note 12, at 995. In some cases, EPA paid award fees
before the quality of the work could be evaluated and despite concurrent recognition that the contractor's performance was inadequate. Ill. at 995-96.
271 Ill. at 996-98.
272 Ill. He also contends that in some instances the Agency acted contrary to
government regulations when it rolled over unpaid award fees from one contract
year to another; for these costs, EPA should be denied recovery. Ill. at 997-98.
273 See Reichelstein, supra note 259, at 713-14.
274 See ill. at 713. Reichelstein argues that cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts can
be improved by using budget-based schemes that place the burden on the contractor, who presumably has the best information regarding the costs of a project, to
select a budget and then make the incentive profit proportional to the budget variance. Ill. at 713-14. According to Reichelstein, previous modeling analysis has
shown that budget-based schemes generate desirable reporting and performance
incentives. Ill. at 714. It is unclear whether Superfund contractors have better
information than EPA about the eventual costs of cleaning up a hazardous wnste
site, although contractors generally can hire more experienced employees than
EPA. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
275 See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOlAFl\ID-92-40,
SUPERFUND: EPA CoST ESTtMATES .ARE NOT RELIABLE OR TIMELY 1-14
(1992)(EPA's cost estimates fail to consider realistic costs for future sites, estimated and actual cleanup costs, and long-term treatment, and are overly optimistic
about extent to which PRPs will finance new cleanup actions); Omgress Cannot
Rely on EPA Cast Estimates to Make Decisions on Program Funding, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 768, 768-69 (July 10, 1992)(same); GAO Says, supra note 120, at 724-25
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The Agency is currently developing more standardized approaches
to cleaning up sites276 and should use incentive contracts based 0)1
cost targets if the Agency can accurately estimate cleanup costs.
Obviously, if EPA continues to furnish partial awards to contrac·
tors despite serious cost overruns, then incentive contracts may
have no more influence than the current CPAF system does in en·
couraging good contractor performance.
CONCLUSION

Superfund contractors have not captured the Superfund pro·
gram. They have, however, formed a dependent bureaucracy that
feeds on the program's structural incentives and EPA's inadequate
staffing. While contractors have not drastically changed Superfund
policies from what these policies probably would have been without
their influence, Superfund contractors have taken advantage of
these shortcomings, and as a result have enjoyed a prosperous
existence.
The lack of clear standards for determining "how clean is
clean" makes it difficult to ascertain whether the Superfund pro·
gram results in too few or too many permanent remedial cleanUpS.277 Structural incentives within the Superfund process seem to
encourage EPA to require more protective approaches: it is the
PRPs that are supposed to pay, and the public generally chooses to
err on the side of safety.
Because the public demands a safe environment, Congress will
unlikely change the structural incentives which currently favor
more protective cleanup measures. Landy and Hague may be correct that cleanup resources would be allocated more efficiently if the
(GAO found many cleanup plans failed to set cleanup goals and EPA agreed that
the Agency should create a new database for Superfund remedies).
276 See Revitalization Program One Year Later: Mix of Better Management,
'Coming of Age,' 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1497 (Oct. 2, 1992)(EPA developing gui.
dance on standardized procedures for cleaning up sites for wood treaters, munici·
pal landfills, and sites contaminated by lead acid batteries and polychlorinated
biphenyls); GAO Says, supra note 120, at 725 (GAO official states that EPA plans
to standardize remedies). Standardized approaches to cleanups would likely utilize
an established process to determine which problems at a site should be addressed,
rather than specifying that a particular method of technology must be used during
every cleanup. See New Technologies, Standard Remedies Pose Conflicts for Re·
gional Officials, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1535 (Oct. 11, 1991). However, there is
potential for conflict between standardizing remedies and stifling innovative tech·
nology. Id.
277 See supra notes 121·27 and accompanying text.
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public directly paid for Superfund cleanups.278 However, a congressional shift of direct costs onto the public is unlikely because the
public probably prefers that the "evil" corporations pay for cleanups. In any event, after PRPs pass on most of their costs, consumers ultimately pay for Superfund cleanups.
Congress and the Clinton administration can change some of
the auditing and funding problems that contribute to excessive contractor costs. In Fiscal Year 1979, during the Carter administration, civilian agencies contracted for services valued at $23 billion.
In Fiscal Year 1991, during the Bush administration, that figure
rose to $55 billion.279 OMB's SWAT Report found that, as of September 30, 1991, there existed a backlog of 13,000 audits with a
value of approximately $160 billion.280 OMB's Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Administrator testified before a congressional
subcommittee that it would take until 1997 to eliminate that backlog at current auditing staff levels.281
The Reagan and Bush administrations encouraged privatization of government based, in part, on a political philosophy that
government workers are lazy and inefficient compared to private
busineSs people.282 Furthermore, the Reagan and Bush administrations tightened civilian agency budgets, at least in real terms. As a
result, agencies used more private contractors to hold down overhead.283 In the case of EPA, Congress shares some responsibility
for significantly increasing the Agency's responsibilities while holding the Agency's budget roughly constant in real dollar terms.284
As discussed above, the general decrease in monetary resources
caused, in some federal departments, a shortage of expertise necessary to perform increasingly specialized jobs. In turn, as OMB's
SWAT Report concluded, some agencies could not function without
contractors.285 For instance, during 1992 the Agency paid $20,000
278
279

See Landy & Hague, supra note 182, at 82-84.
See OFPP Plans, supra note 146 (testimony of J. Dexter Peach, Assistant

Comptroller General of GAO at House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Dec. 3, 1992).
280 See id. (testimony of Allan Burman, Administrator of Office of Federal Procurement Policy of OMB at House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Dec. 3, 1992).
281

Id.

Editorial, u.s. Called Off, supra note 244, at A12.
See Dan Morgan, u.s. Acknowledges Flaws in Contract Audit System: OMB
Reports Lax Oversight of Payments, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1992, at A8.
284 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
285 For the Government, supra note 241, at E2.
282

283
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to a contractor to prepare an official response to a congressional
report which criticized the Agencyts improper use of contractorsl286
The proposed fiscal 1993 budget for EPA, however, could significantly slash contractor appropriations. 287
The Clinton administration must reject the Reagan-Bush
dogma that private contractors are necessarily better than government employees. While privatization is sometimes more efficient, a
government agency needs sufficient qualified staff to supervise private contractors and to make key policy decisions. To rephrase
President Reagan, sometimes government may be the solution
rather than the problem. 288
A recent government study concluded that there are fundamental problems with the federal contracting program because the
Reagan and Bush administrations slashed the number of government auditors and contractor supervisors while simultaneously expanding the use of private contractors to perform government
functions. 289 Congress and the Clinton administration must redress
the balance between the use of private contractors and the need for
adequate government staff to monitor contractors. In particular,
Congress should mandate that EPA personnel make all key policy
decisions regarding cleanup methods and should require that EPA
staff actually supervise the cleanup work of both contractors and
PRPs. Carol M. Browner,29o the new EPA Administrator, must
Id.
Plan to Distribute EPA Budget Cuts Likely to Affect Contractors, Analysts
Say, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2091, 2091-92 (Dec. 25, 1992)(Congress reduced Bush
administration budget request for EPA by over $100 million, and as a result then
EPA Administrator William Reilly reluctantly proposed cuts for other contractorinvolved programs such as global warming, North American Free Trade Agreement, and Montreal Protocol on phaseout of chemicals that deplete stratospheric
ozone layer). It is unclear what the impact will be on Superfund contractors, but
the Agency is decreasing its Superfund appropriation for the first time since
SARA's enactment. Id. at 2092.
288 Ronald Reagan won the 1980 presidential election in part because of his popular slogan, "Government is the problem, not the solution." See, e.g., Steven V.
Roberts et al., That Sinking Feeling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 2, 1992, at
22.
289 See Dan Morgan, supra note 283; u.s. Says, supra note 229, at AI, C20;
OFPP Plans, supra note 146.
290 See Keith Schneider, The Nominee/or E.P.A. Sees Industry's Side Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A13 (discussing Browner's record). As head of Florida's
Department of Environmental Regulation, Browner rejuvenated a demoralized
staff of 1500 and made the agency one of the most active in the Florida government. Id. On March 10, 1993, EPA Administrator Browner told a House subcommittee that she was "appalled" by the Bush administration's record on EPA
contract management and pledged aggressive remedies. Browner Assails Past Con286

287
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improve the Agency's management of its contractors and revitalize
its staff. It remains to be seen whether the Clinton administration
and Browner can overcome the budget limitations and statutory demands that led the Agency to rely so heavily upon private contractors in the first place.
tract Management, Tells House Panel Sweeping Change Coming. 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 3012 (Mar. 19, 1993). In putting together the fiscal year 1994 budget, she
pledged not to reduce contract management staff. ld.
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